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The Immigration Generation: Nativity and the Political Socialization

of Filipino and Vietnamese Americans

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

Requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Political Science

by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Prudencio Segui and Lumen Segui. Their hard work and sacrifice bought me the opportunities that I have, and made me into the person I am today.

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I would like to thank Professor Kathleen Bruhn for her support in my graduate studies. I also want to thank Professor M. Kent Jennings for his vast insight in the political socialization literature. Finally, I want to thank the chair of my dissertation committee, Professor Eric R. A. N. Smith, for his incredible patience and for being a terrific mentor.

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ABSTRACT

The Immigration Generation: Nativity and the Political Socialization

Of Filipino and Vietnamese Americans

By

Alan Serrano Segui

Does immigration influence the formation of political ideologies? In this study, I identify and explain important agents of political socialization among first, 1.5, and second generation Filipino and Vietnamese Americans. Specifically, I investigate which factors shape the political ideology of these Asian Americans and compare the factors across ethnic and nativity groups. I analyze the reported results of the Los Angeles Times and the Pilot Study of the National Asian American surveys. In addition, I interviewed 107 Filipino Americans and 66 Vietnamese Americans in California. The respondents were chosen by a snowball sampling method.

I find that the pre-adult socialization model provides a better explanation for the socialization of Filipino and Vietnamese Americans than the adult socialization model. However, the data suggest that stronger political socialization for younger 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans tends to occur in later childhood. This is in contrast to the first and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans, whose

socialization tends to occur in early childhood. Similarly, the data suggest that political socialization occurs in early childhood among younger 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans. The results are mixed for first and older 1.5 generation Filipino Americans; more influential political socialization occurred in either early or late childhood depending on the circumstances of the respondents' upbringing in the Philippines.

The results of this study provide further evidence that supports social learning and cognitive development models of socialization. The differences between groups in their political socialization processes also reflect Mannheim's framework of how generations function. The interview data reveal several key factors of political socialization: language barriers, parental transmission of political knowledge, ethnic enclaves, the migration experience, and formal education. These factors echo conclusions made by earlier researchers.

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CHAPTER ONE: NATIVITY AND SOCIALIZATION

This project attempted to reinvigorate the political socialization debate by

promoting studies investigating the effects of immigration on the political

socialization process. In an American society where immigration levels swelled in

the last three decades, how immigrants and their offspring are politically socialized is

an important scholarly question. This is important because most of the

groundbreaking empirical studies and fundamental theories of political socialization

were performed or constructed before the immigration explosion began in the United

States in the late 1970s (see Dawson, Prewitt, Dawson 1977). Moreover, additional

socializing agents might be found by looking at, for example, the context behind the

emigration. In a broader sense, many of the recent immigrants to the United States—

specifically refugees and economic migrants from developing countries—were

subjected to forms of political socialization that were outside the framework of most

studies conducted at the peak of political socialization research—during the 1960s

and early 70s. This project attempts to uncover those forms of political socialization

by comparing Filipino and Vietnamese Americans.

DEFINING IDEOLOGY, NATIVITY AND GENERATIONS

In attempting to answer this research question, key variables need to be

defined. Political ideology is defined as the set of attitudes regarding the role of

government, institutions, and policy. For this project, political ideology will be

determined by looking at existing survey data of specific Asian American ethnic groups. Nativity is the status of one's birth and immigration. An individual is considered "first generation," if he or she were born in another country and subsequently immigrated to the United States as a teenager or adult, age 13 or older. An individual is considered "1.5 generation" if he or she were born in the country of their ancestry and immigrated to the United States as a child or adolescent, aged 12 or younger. An individual is considered "second generation" if the individual was born in the United States.

Functions of Generations

Karl Mannheim (1952) explains that the existence of generations is "the best way to appreciate…features of social life" (p. 292). He argues that the concept of generation is not that of a concrete group, such as a community. Rather it is "constituted essentially by a similarity of location of a number of individuals within a social whole… (and the) generation location is determined by the way in which certain patterns of experience and thought tend to be brought into existence by the natural data" (p. 290-292). In this project, the parameters for each generation are not established arbitrarily, but are based on common experiences shared among the members within that generational group. For example, second generation Asian Americans lack the insight into the immigrant experience that the first generation Asian Americans have. Moreover, difficulties in assimilating into American society are far less serious for the second generation than they are for the first generation.

Mannheim (1952) describes how generations exist and function in society. First, new participants in the cultural process emerge while previous participants in that process continue to disappear (p. 292). This project will show that newer generations will have certain issues, advantages, and expectations that are different than older generations. Next, since members of a particular generation can only live for a limited period of time in history, it is the necessary for them to continually transmit the accumulated cultural heritage to their offspring (p. 292). This project will examine the ability of first and 1.5 generation respondents to transmit cultural and political knowledge to their offspring. Finally, Mannheim believes that the "transition from generation to generation is a continuous process" (p. 292). Although the interaction between generations is smoother because of the continuity in the transmission process (p. 301), the project will examine situations where war, immigration, and culture shock undermine this continuity.

Mannheim states that the new generation creates and accumulates culture, while the dying out of the old generation enables the society to forget: "to be able to start afresh with a new life, to build a new destiny, a new framework of anticipations upon a new set of experiences, are things which can come only through the fact of new birth" (p. 293-297). Therefore, a new generation emerges in which common experiences among its members are shared. This project will illustrate numerous common experiences shared among members of the same generational group, which have significant roles in influencing the political ideologies of its members. Mannheim concludes that "what strikes one in considering any particular generation

unit is the great similarity in the data making up the consciousness of its members.

Mental data are of sociological importance not only because of their actual content,

but also because they the individuals sharing them to form one group—they have a

socializing effect" (p. 304). This project will investigate how and why this data have

a socializing effect on different nativity generations of Filipino and Vietnamese

Americans.

GOALS OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT

The purpose of this project is to determine whether and how nativity affects

one's political ideology. There are several reasons that contributed to Asian

migration to the United States: greater economic opportunities, fear of political

persecution in the home country, and family reunification. How might the effects of

nativity on political ideology vary among different ethnic groups? While this

question is empirical in nature, the findings will hopefully contribute to the political

socialization discourse, especially with respect to what events or stimuli are crucial in

shaping a person's political ideology. Little research has been done on the political

beliefs of Asian Americans--Pei-Te Lien and her colleagues (2001) have made the

greatest inroads in recent years. Still, the relationship between nativity and political

socialization among this group is one area I would like to investigate. The goals of

this project were to determine 1) whether ideological differences existed between

American-born and Asian-born Asian Americans, 2) whether these ideological

differences varied across different sub-groups of Asian Americans, 3) what factors

might have explained these differences in political ideology, and 4) whether these

factors were rooted in childhood or adulthood experiences.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR OFFSPRING

Two significant studies by James Lamare (1974) and F. Chris Garcia (1973)

examined the political socialization of Mexican American youths in Texas and

California, respectively. Lamare identifies the significance of the English language

barrier as a key role in impeding the socialization of Chicano youths into the "Anglo-

American political world" (Lamare 1974 p. 65). Meanwhile, Garcia describes the

strong psychological, cultural and ancestral connection that Mexican Americans have

with Mexico. Moreover, Garcia argues that while younger Mexican Americans

showed a strong orientation towards the American regime, adolescent Mexican

Americans become more disillusioned due to their perceived rejection by American

society (Garcia 1973). Themes from both studies will be investigated in this research

project, using Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans.

After its peak in the late 1970s, scholarship in political socialization began to

taper off in the 1980s due to the changing conventional wisdom regarding pre-adult

socialization (Sears 1990, Jennings 2001). Studies on immigrant political

socialization are scarce—Hoskin (1989) and Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewit's (1989) work

on political socialization of immigrants from Latin America are among the most

notable. However, according to Jennings (2007), political socialization research has increased in the 1990s, in part due to "large-scale immigration patterns (which) presented opportunities for adult re-socialization."

Given the large number of Asian American ethic groups, this project will focus on two Asian American groups that have significant American born and Asian born populations: Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans. I explain my selection of these groups in the "Research Design—Selection of Cases" section.

JUSTIFICATION OF RESEARCH PROJECT

Why do a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the political attitudes of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans, born inside and outside the United States? Why is this project important? While this project is intended to contribute to the scholarly work in political science and in Asian American studies, I identify three main justifications behind this project: 1) As I mentioned earlier, there is a lack of political socialization research that investigates the effects of immigration from countries that are culturally, politically, and socially different from the United States. 2) There is a lack of quantitative studies in the Asian American political literature; most available work is qualitative. 3) Asian America is not a monolithic group, despite some shared experiences and history while in the United States.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND IMMIGRATION TRENDS

James Gimpel et al (2003) identifies several important variables that explain how and when political socialization occurs including communities and neighborhoods, racial groups, religion, and schools. They also discuss how one's political viewpoints can be shaped by these variables. Their findings are based on a study over 3000 high school students in the Baltimore-Washington metro area. Interestingly, they note that there is a high level of "external efficacy" among Anglo Americans and Asian Americans who live close together, while "living within a co-ethnic enclave is not conducive to a positive socialization experience" (p. 91). In this project, potential socializing factors such as ethnic enclaves, schools and Catholicism will be investigated. Also, since this is a comparative analysis of two Asian American groups, this project will seek to determine whether political socialization is similar among both ethnic groups, which Gimpel et al imply.

The Garcia (1973) and Lamare (1974) studies do not take into consideration whether the subjects (Mexican American youths) are American or Mexican born. Meanwhile the Hoskin (1989) and Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewit (1989) studies focus primarily on adult socialization. This project believes that nativity is an important control variable. This project looks at Filipino and Vietnamese immigration to the United States in the last thirty years, and assessing how the political socialization process might be different compared to someone who was born and raised in the United States, and whose parents were born and raised in the United States. This is not to suggest that these two groups provide all the answers, but rather to suggest that

immigrants and children of immigrants must undergo additional or different

socializing experiences, unlike those whose roots in the United States span several

generations.

Political socialization studies in the 1960s and 70s did not initially address the

political socialization of immigrants and their offspring. Only recently have scholars

begun to investigate how immigration affects political socialization, particularly

socialization of adults. The circumstances that promoted American liberalization of

its immigration policy in 1965 and refugee policy in the 1970s and 1980s have

created different environments for political socialization for different ethnic groups of

Asian immigrants. Moreover, the socio-economic characteristics of recent Asian

immigrants, namely education and class, are different compared to earlier Asian

immigrants. Furthermore, race relations in America in the last three decades have

gone through a significant transformation. How Americans of different ethnicities

now perceive Asian American immigrants and their offspring is different than it was

before the Civil Rights Movement. This project in intended to find out how, and in

whom, that process occurs.

Early (Pre-1965) versus Late (Post-1965) Asian Immigration

The plight of Asian immigrants who arrived in the United States in the last

thirty years is fundamentally different from earlier Asian immigrants—those who

arrived in the United States between 1850 and 1965. Early immigrants were

predominantly young, unattached males with relatively low levels of education, technical skills, and English fluency. Early immigrants came primarily from Japan (about 400,000 came during the period), China (about 300,000), and Philippines (about 180,000). An additional 8,000 Koreans and 8,000 Asian Indians also arrived in this period. Most Asian immigrants settled either in Hawaii and the West Coast states of the U.S. mainland. The main pull factor behind early immigration to the United States was the search for economic opportunity (Chan 1991, Takaki 1998).

By contrast, the circumstances behind post-1965 Asian immigration were more diverse, and the demographics of other Asian immigrants were significantly different. War and fear of political persecution were as important, if not more important, than economic factors behind immigration. Post-1965 immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India were generally more educated and possessed greater technical skills than pre-1965 Asian immigrants. Not surprisingly, English fluency rates were relatively high among Filipino and Asian Indian immigrants. Furthermore, the gender ratio was more balanced among the later Asian immigrants. It should be pointed out that although U.S. immigration policy was liberalized in 1965, Asian immigration to the United States did not take off until the early 1970s (Chan 1991).

QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE STUDIES OF ASIAN AMERICA

This project incorporates evaluation of existing quantitative research (survey

data) and new qualitative research (interview data). Although quantitative research in political science has grown in prominence in the last two decades, the penetration of this research into Asian American Studies has only occurred in the last few years. Since its inception in the early 1970s, social science approaches to Asian American studies have been overwhelmingly historical and quantitative; the genesis of the discipline was itself historical.

While previous qualitative research has been crucial in promoting awareness of Asian America and in elevating the community from its historically marginal status (see Chan 1991, Takaki 1998), quantitative research in Asian American Studies provides an opportunity to learn more about this growing and diverse community. While rich oral histories and in-depth interviews might explain how Asian American political attitudes were shaped (see Kibria 1990, Espiritu 1995, Freeman 1995), only larger-N survey data can verify the importance of specific factors of Asian American political socialization (see Lai et al 2001, Lien 2001, Lien et al 2001, and Lien 2003).

Studies that chronicled and analyzed the plight of Asian Americans since their arrival in the United States in the late1840s have greatly legitimized the field of Ethnic Studies. Though the field draws from multiple disciplines—history and political science among them—it has yet to fully tap into the pool of quantitative research. Surveys of political attitudes and opinions of Asian Americans—or at least surveys with a large enough sample size to be statistically significant—have been conducted only recently (Los Angeles Times 1994 and 1995, Pilot Study of the National Asian American Survey 2001). Just as quantitative research has in recent

years swelled in political science, its growing presence in Asian American Studies will help further legitimize its use in the discipline and provide an avenue for prospective scholars, trained in quantitative research, to utilize their skills.

By advocating the use of quantitative research, I am not suggesting that ethnic studies should abandon qualitative research. In fact, a key part of this project utilizes new data from in-depth interviews as the bases for understanding the processes that potential socializing agents might have in shaping political ideologies. However, analysis of large-N survey data is necessary to determine the generalizability of conclusions deduced from quantitative studies. Given the significant and fast-growing Asian American community today, survey research of Asian American political attitudes has begun. But more importantly, the populations of some Asian American ethic groups are now sufficiently large that political attitudes of ethnic groups can be measured.

ASIAN AMERICA IS NOT HOMOGENOUS

Asian American pan-ethnicity emerged in the late 1960s. This pan-ethnic consciousness manifested as a result of a "shared history of racialization through discriminatory government policies in areas such as immigration, naturalization, and federal mortgage policies" (Geron et al. 2001 p. 619). At the community level, actions such as hate crimes (a term not formalized in the legal sense until 1990), neighborhood segregation, and labor market discrimination confronted Asian

Americans. Such action mobilized Asian Americans of different religious, political, and linguistic backgrounds.

One of the major manifestations of this movement was the 1968-69 Third World Liberation strikes at San Francisco State University. Similar protests also took place at the University of California, Berkeley. These student-led demonstrations facilitated the formation of the first Asian American Studies Department. With the formalization of the discipline, literature on Asian Americans, especially fiction and historical studies, exploded. Scholars like Sucheng Chan and Ronald Takaki authored the most comprehensive compilations of Asian American history. In addition to their work are numerous, oral histories reflecting personal accounts of major events such as the Japanese internment during World War II, the Second Indochina War, the killing fields of Cambodia, and the oppressive Marcos regime (Chan 1991, Takaki 1998). As Asian American communities and enclaves grew and emerged, research documenting the events, blossomed.

It is increasingly important for scholars to begin re-evaluating the attitudes of the Asian American community. Race-relations in the United States are not simply "Black versus White' (see Kiang and Kaplan 1994). Moreover, the inclusion of Asian Americans in discussions about race and politics should not assume that "all Asians think alike." One of the reasons that this project examined specific Asian American ethic groups was to undermine the notion that Asian Americans were a monolithic, homogenous group. To assume that Asian Americans thought and acted the same was problematic because the context behind, and the consequences of, each

ethnic group's immigration and resettlement in the United States over the last three decades were different. The most egregious example of lumping Asian Americans together is in the "Model Minority" literature (Peterson 1966, Suzuki 1977, Osajima 1987), which stresses the high levels of education and income achieved by Asian Americans. Though the purpose of this project was not to engage in a debate over the validity of the Model Minority Thesis, what proponents of the argument did not fully consider was that income and education levels varied widely across different Asian American ethnic groups (Cabezas 1979). One could therefore deduce that there must be structural factors that explain inter-ethnic disparities in education and income (see Chapter 4).

Thus, potential variations in political ideology between ethnic groups— Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans, for example—might stem from structural factors such as education, income, religion, or occupation. The differences between Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans with other Asian American groups are also numerous and significant. While it is necessary to make certain generalizations about groups in order to draw useful comparisons or even to generate theories explaining the behavior, to assume that Asian Americans "are the same" is to dismiss profound and fundamental ethnic differences (see Bonus 2000).

To conflate Confucianism with Asian America is to dismiss the dominant influence of Catholicism in the Philippines or Hinduism in India. To conflate the Model Minority image with Asian America is to dismiss the current struggles of Hmong, Lao, and Cambodian communities in the United States. To assume that

Asian immigrants came to the United States for economic opportunity is to dismiss the fears of refugees of political persecution by newly instituted Communist regimes. In other words, too much is lost by generalizing the Asian "race" in America.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter two is a review of the political socialization literature, which outlines the arguments of and the differences between pre-adult and adult socialization. Chapter three discusses the methods and research design, and explains the selection of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans as the subjects for this research project. Chapter four examines and interprets existing quantitative data regarding the political behavior and socio-economic characteristics of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans. Chapters five and six describe and analyze the generational effects of political socialization through interview data—Filipino Americans are discussed in chapter five, Vietnamese Americans in chapter six. Chapter seven offers some conclusions about the effects of nativity on political socialization for these groups and ideas about future research on this subject.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORIES OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AS APPLIED TO IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR OFFSPRING

The goal of this project is to contribute to the debate in the political socialization literature regarding how and when in a person's life most of his political learning, which leads to the formation of his ideological preferences, takes place. This project compares three different nativity groups of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans: the First Generation--those who were born in Asia, but immigrated to the United States when they were adolescents or adults, the 1.5 Generation--those who were born in Asia, but immigrated to the United States when they were children (defined as age 12 or younger), and the Second Generation: those who were born in the United States. A key question for this project is whether different generations who experienced different paths towards assimilation into American society will learn different things from different stimuli that result in the formation of different ideologies.

Mannheim (1952) offers this assessment of how offspring learn:

The data transmitted by conscious teaching are of more limited importance, both quantitatively and qualitatively. All those attitudes and ideas which go on functioning satisfactorily in the new situation and serve as the basic inventory of group life are unconsciously and unwittingly handed and transmitted…the new germ of an original intellectual and spiritual life which is latent in the new human being has by no means as yet come into its own…the possibility of really questioning and reflecting on things only emerges at the point where personal experimentation…begins (at around age

17) (p. 299-300).

Many political socialization scholars argue that certain types of political learning take place only during childhood and early adolescence (Dawson, Prewitt and Dawson, 1977). Supporting Mannheim's claim, Jennings and Markus (1977) conclude in their study that as "individuals progress through life cycles they typically encounter a number of experiences which may reinforce or alter pre-existing values" (p.131). For this project, I am interested specifically in aspects of political learning that lead to the formation of political ideology—thus, when I am discussing the concept of "political learning, " I am referring to this process.

One part of this project tests the assumption that political ideology is shaped by childhood events, and is crystallized by adulthood. This is important because the environment in which most of the political learning transpired is fundamentally different between each generational group. Also, the experience of immigration itself should differentiate these groups. Furthermore, the expected political ideology for the 1.5 generation should be located somewhere in between, since a significant amount of childhood political learning occurred both in Asia and in the United States.

Suppose, however, it is found that nativity does not affect political ideology or that ideological differences between generations are not significant? The conclusion would be that most political learning is based on stimuli from events and experiences occurring during adulthood. Thus, political ideology is more likely based on recent phenomena.

The other component of my research will test theories of political socialization. If, for example, it is found, based on interview data, that nativity reflects differences in political ideology, then the results would tend to support theories of pre-adult (childhood and adolescent) political socialization. If nativity matters, then where the respondent engaged in most of his childhood or pre-adult political learning--in Asia or in the United States--should also matter. For example, if recent events fail to affect first generation Asian Americans to the same degree as the second or 1.5 generation, then disparities in political ideology between generations might be rooted in events that occurred much earlier in the respondents' lives. This project examines factors that shape the political learning process, focusing primarily on events and stimuli that existed during the respondent's childhood. The idea here is that the formation of political ideology actually develops at an early age, only to crystallize or marginally change by adulthood. Thus, I make a distinction between first generation (those born in Asia, but immigrated to the United States after the age of 12) and the 1.5 generation (those born in Asia, but immigrated when they were 12 or younger) in order to account for political differences in early political socialization between the generations of each ethnic groups. Because this development occurs in two different places—in Asia for the first generation, in America for the 1.5 and second generation—comparing the different environments where most of the political learning transpires is crucial.

Sample sizes of third and subsequent generations will not be included because the number of adult who are third generation or later is very small. Most immigrants

from these countries did not arrive in the United States until the 1970s. While there

were approximately 180,000 Filipinos who immigrated to the United States prior to

1965, they were overwhelmingly male. In fact, in the 1920s—the period just before

Filipinos were excluded from immigrating to the United States—the gender ratio

among Filipino Americans in the U.S. mainland was 93 males for every 7 females.

Furthermore, anti-miscegenation laws that banned marriages to white women made it

difficult for early Filipinos immigrants to have families. It was not until 1948 that

these laws were declared unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court. Thus, the

Filipino community in the United States prior to 1965 was essentially a "bachelor

society" (Takaki 1998, Espiritu 2000).

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND REGIME TYPE

Given the political situation in Asia, specifically the political regimes in the

Philippines and Vietnam in the 1970s and 80s, how children from these countries

were socialized was profoundly different than children raised in the United States.

Merelmen's (1990) study compared the socialization process of children who lived

under political regimes whose legitimacy was "contested" (including the Philippines)

and "uncontested." He argued that children living under "contested" regimes were

socialized into believing that political conflict was conventional and acceptable, even

necessary, whereas children living under "uncontested" regimes were socialized into

believing that political conflict was reprehensible and aberrant. Those who engaged

in political conflict in contested regimes were seen as good and benevolent by their own groups, and bad by other rival groups (p. 49-57). In fact, Merelmen suggests that a process called "deindividuation" occurs in contested regimes, in which groups of people are all the same and no individual possesses unique qualities (p. 53). This process develops behavioral cues for the child as early as age 3, and it facilitates discrimination.

Applying this to the case of Vietnam, the victorious Communists emerged as the good group, while those connected with the defunct South Vietnamese became the bad group, and those members were subsequently persecuted or killed. The events after Communist takeover profoundly impacted the political ideologies of those who would later emigrate to the United States.

By contrast, those in uncontested regimes are given information and analytic knowledge that enables individuals to evaluate and challenge "the group is all the same" evaluations. While the Ferdinand Marcos regime was authoritarian, there were democratic elements that existed in the Philippine political system. Elections were held, the press was relatively free, the Catholic Church (a major opponent of the Marcos regime post-Martial Law) was autonomous, and universities were effective in mobilizing and informing anti-Marcos supporters. Even though the Marcos regime did not end until 1985, the last 15 years of his rule was marred by a series of demonstrations and protests by student, religious, and labor groups. Despite Marcos' attempts to brand his political opponents as communists, and therefore "bad" for Philippine society, most Filipinos sympathized with one or more of the groups who

pushed for an end to the Marcos regime. By the 1980s, challenges to the authoritarian Marcos regime were vocal, heterogeneous and widespread (Bello and Reyes 1986-87, Espiritu 1995).

In either case, the socialization of individuals is based on general "event representations" (Merelmen 1990), where certain significant or repetitive events that occurred in childhood become the world or the environment of that person, crystallizing in adulthood.

PRE-ADULT POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION THEORIES

In the socialization literature there are three general theories of pre-adult political socialization, approaches that explain how political learning transpires: psycho-dynamic theories, social learning theories, and cognitive development theories. Although the examples I provide are my own, the taxonomy of pre-adult socialization theories is paraphrased from Dawson, Prewitt, and Dawson (1977).

Psycho-Dynamic Theories

Example: A young child exposed to the horrors of the Vietnam War may develop attitudes which oppose policies expanding the American military.

Social Learning Theories

Example: In a poor family, the parents may continuously remind a child that getting education is important in order to lift himself and his family from poverty. The parents arrive at this conclusion based on observations of their friends, assertions by teachers, and information from the media. At times when this child skips school or fails to do his homework, he is lectured or disciplined. At times when the child has done well, the parents reward him with extra affection and encouragement. These stimuli eventually lead the child, once he reaches adulthood, to favor government policies that increase funding for public education.

Cognitive Development Theories

Example: An Asian American high school senior living in California may support Affirmative Action policies regarding undergraduate admission to the University of California, because he strongly believes in correcting past racial disparities that have hurt Native Americans, African Americans, and Latino Americans. This is despite the fact that implementation of affirmative action would adversely affect his own chances of gaining admission. He "chooses" this position on Affirmative Action, knowing that it may undermine his academic interests. The student considers the rewards or punishments imposed by the environment--in this instance, rejection by a more prestigious University of California campus possibly occurring in order to accommodate more applicants from under-represented groups--but does not

automatically yield to them when making his decision.

<u>PRE-ADULT SOCIALIZATION DEBATE</u>

The purpose of this section is to outline the debate among the three theoretical "schools" of Pre-Adult Political Socialization, drawing on empirical research. Each of these theories supports the idea that most of the socialization process that an individual goes through occurs during childhood only to crystallize during adulthood. However, psycho-dynamic, social learning, and cognitive development theories differ from each other in terms of the importance of childhood age, influence of socializing agents, and mental processing of information.

Political socialization can be defined as "the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing political system" (Sigel 1970 p. xii). It "refers to the way in which society transmits political orientations— knowledge, attitudes or norms, and values—from generation to generation" (Easton and Dennis 1965 p. 41).

So if the political socialization process is "gradual," presumably continuing onward throughout a person's life, why would proponents of pre-adult political socialization be correct in arguing that political attitudes and behaviors stem primarily from experiences occurring in childhood—a period that usually constitutes a small fraction of a person's life? The answer may lie in the fact that children receive "transmissions of political orientations" from adults. Moreover, the transmission of

these orientations from the older generation tends more to be readily and willingly absorbed at an earlier age. In other words, younger children tend more to accept information and ideas that come from family, schools, media, and the community environment. Thus, once these political orientations are sufficiently acquired, usually by late adolescence or early adulthood, then the socialization process of the individual during adulthood entails nothing more than a crystallization of those orientations. In other words, significant changes in one's political orientations that occur only during adulthood are rare. A recent example that affirms this point is a study by Jennings (2002), who uses long-term panel data from the high school student who graduated in 1965. He concludes that differences in political ideology and levels of political participation between protestors and non-protestors remained consistent through the years, as both groups reach their 50s.

Psycho-Dynamic Theories

Psycho-dynamic theories suggest that political socialization is fueled by events that occur during early childhood, and is based heavily on the psychological make-up of the individual. These theories are Freudian-based. They look at significant events and/or stimuli that occur during early childhood and leave a deep imprint on the individual. The formation of political ideology at adulthood stems from such events.

Schacter and Adler conducted a series of "birth order" studies, which

examined the psychology of those were either the first-born child or the only child in the family. It was found that first born children became more resentful and insecure, developing a greater mistrust of people, and became either more conservative and cautious in life or were more likely to engage in deviant roles. This occurs because with the existence of younger children in the family, the first born loses the parental love and attention that had previously been theirs alone to receive. Furthermore, first-born and only child cases also experienced greater dependence or affiliation in later years, stemming from the fact that the amount of parental love they received tended to be great at times, but often inconsistent (Schacter 1959, Adler 1931). While birth order research itself is not a potential hypothesis in this project, the implication is that inconsistencies in the amount of affection and love received by children might be a socializing agent. For immigrants, this occurs because families were often separated for long periods of time due to political persecution and economic difficulties that resulted in parents working overseas, only to reunify when they permanently resettled in the United States. Whatever the case, family structures might have been distorted or destroyed prior to resettlement in the United States.

The implications of this research suggest that attitudes on government and policy may be based strictly on one's psychology. For example, a conservative approach to life may be linked to conservatism in politics. A psychological disposition to mistrust people may translate into a mistrust of government or powerful political leaders. While my research acknowledges the potential effects of Freudian-based psychology, namely in investigating instances of disjointed family structures

borne out of immigration, most contemporary scholars in political socialization dismiss psycho-dynamics theories.

Social Learning Theories

Social learning theories assert that acquisition of political orientations stem from a cost-benefit calculus. These theories are based on rewards and punishment. In other words, political ideology is based on the individual receiving a benefit or incurring a cost as a result of that person's actions during early and late childhood. The benefit or cost from the previous action affects future action as the individual avoids decisions he believes the environment will "punish" and seeks to make decisions the environment will "reward." In addition, social learning theory entails imitation, meaning that one's attitudes and action are shaped by replicating similar patterns observed in others. Imitation is often successful because the actors are rewarded for replicating normative behavior--through praise, popularity, and acceptance from others--and punished for deviating from normative behavior-- through taunts, isolation, and contempt from others.

Major studies involving elementary and junior high school children conducted in the 1960 found that younger children developed a generally positive view of political leaders as well as government, oftentimes before knowing the meaning and constitution of government (Easton and Dennis 1965, Greenstein 1965, Hess and Torney 1967). It is during the elementary school years that children begin to learn

about people and institutions in government (i.e. the presidency, political parties, voting). Moreover, families have a significant role in transmitting political orientations to children, such as party identification. One reason why younger children might have a more positive view of political leaders and government is because of their inherent vulnerability. Thus, to cope with their own vulnerability, these children see familial, communal or political authority figures (or the government) as neither dangerous nor malicious (Hess and Torney 1967). Greenstein also notes that as children get older, become less vulnerable, and acquire more knowledge about government, they tend to develop higher levels of cynicism towards politics and political leaders.

Later studies of children from disadvantaged backgrounds challenged the assumption that younger children had generally positive views of political leaders and government, citing geographic, socio-economic and racial bias in earlier research (Jaros, Hirsch, Fleron 1968, Greenberg 1970, Renshon 1975). Jaros and his colleagues found consistently high levels of cynicism towards government among students of all grade levels. Critical to this study was that the sample was drawn from an impoverished region in Kentucky, where levels of disrupted family structure were significantly higher. In fact, they found that families were generally ineffective in cultivating respect for authority among youth. Incidentally, Greenstein's study of elementary and junior high students in New Haven, despite asserting that younger children had more positive views of political leaders and the government than older children, also found that behavioral differences existed between children of different

socio-economic backgrounds. Specifically, Greenstein's (1965) work showed

children from working-class families were more likely to show deference to authority

than upper class children. Along the same lines, Hess and Torney's (1967) study also

showed discrepancies in the views regarding the responsiveness of government to the

average person and personal political efficacy. They found that less affluent children

believed the government to be less responsive and they felt less efficacious in dealing

with the political system.

Also, Greenberg's (1970) study of children in Philadelphia found that young

black children were relatively more detached and less loyal to the political

community than their white counterparts, and had lower levels of identification with

the president as an authority figure. The discrepancy in political attitudes between

blacks and whites existed in all grades, although older black children were more

positive in their view of the president and more negative in their opinion of local

authorities than their younger black counterparts. Greenburg attributes this

discrepancy to the lack of inducements by the American political system to develop

attachments between blacks and the political system.

Garcia's (1973) comparison of 683 Mexican Americans and 544 Anglo

Americans in California concludes that affection levels for the American political

community are slightly higher among Mexican Americans than Anglo Americans

when they are young, but significantly lower once they reach adolescence. Mexican

American adolescents, according to Garcia, tend to perceive the United States as less

democratic as it claims to be and tend to pay less attention to the government. This is

because Mexican Americans, as they get older, perceive a growing gap between the promise and accomplishments of the American democratic system. Consequently, Garcia explains that Mexican American young adults have lower levels of positive political participation (such as voting or running for office) and higher levels of negative participation (such as boycotts, strikes, or demonstrations).

Campbell (2006) argues that political heterogeneity fuels conflict, which motivates individuals to vote and to become more politically active in campaigns and protests: "political heterogeneity…fosters political efficacy—a sense that one can make a difference in the wider political environment" (p. 126). Campbell argues that heterogeneous environments stimulate political participation. This night explain the negative political participation among adolescent and young adult Mexican Americans in Garcia's investigation.

Given the racial disparities in political attitudes, one must also consider when such attitudes are functions of family upbringing. Do parents play a significant role in politically socializing their children? Kent Tedin's (1974) article focused on the ability of parents to transmit their party identification and issue attitudes to the children. He found that parental influence is possible if the political issues are salient to the parent and if the child is accurate in perceiving those parental attitudes.

Lamare (1974) also affirms that parents can be significant agents of political socialization. Their results suggest that "some Mexican American parents seem able to teach their children political awareness, positive disposition toward the political system, and political and personal efficacy" (p. 82). Thus, factors of political

socialization such as class and race can be neutralized by parental influences, when applicable. Later, in his concluding remarks, Lamare states that the reason for differences in transmission among Spanish-speaking parents is a question for future research. How political ideologies are influenced by parental influence will be addressed in this project.

More recent scholarship includes work by Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2002), which reexamines the ability of families to transmit political attitudes. They found that children whose parents are highly politicized tend to adopt political attitudes which are similar to their parents. More specifically, "if parents are politically engaged and frequently discuss politics with the child, transmission rates rise substantially…(Also,) political reproduction across the generations occurs even more frequently when the parental attitudes are reasonably consistent over time…(Moreover,) if parents are stable on topics spanning the political spectrum will (tend to have) children (who replicate) their parents' political character to a much broader extent" (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2002, p. 20-21).

David Campbell's (2006) study states that adolescents are "more likely to engage in civic activity in homogeneous environments" (p. 95). In other words, neighborhoods or communities that have more political consensus are ideal environments for adolescent participation in decision making and volunteerism. Campbell adds that "adolescents who volunteer become adults who vote" (p. 126). Thus, Campbell believes that homogenous environments, like heterogeneous ones discussed above, also facilitate political participation, although this effect might be

delayed (p.173).

Parental transmission of cultural and political values to their offspring is another factor of political socialization that will be investigated in this project. Many 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans and Filipino Americans in the last thirty years experienced long periods of physical separation between parents and minor children. This might have occurred as a result of war, where parents became casualties. It could occur when parents seek economic opportunities in other countries, and remit the money to the family "back home." It could also result from lags in the immigration process where certain family members immigrate first in order to bring others later. Regardless of the reason for physical separation, children who experience this separation presumably are less likely to replicate the political and cultural attitudes of their parents. By contrast, second generation Americans would be less likely to have experienced the same physical separation, since family structure would probably have been re-formed by the time of the child's birth. Thus measuring the political ideology of the 1.5 generation is important, because the timing of their experience of immigration distinguishes them from the first generation. Likewise, the experience of war and/or immigration among 1.5 generation respondents is not shared by the second generation.

So what do these various studies have to say about social learning theory and its viability? One core of the theory comes from the idea that political orientations are shaped by the rewards or punishment incurred by the individual. The family and school structures are two prime arenas where such payoffs can be given. Moreover,

these arenas are also useful in providing the individual with models to imitate the appropriate political behavior, and internalize the political orientation of others-- namely, family members, friends, classmates and teachers. In fact, renewed interest in the question of persistence and the dynamics of learning is a major reason for much of the recent political socialization research" (Jennings 2007). In this context, "persistence" refers to the viewpoint that the remnants of childhood socialization are relatively immune to change in later years (see Sears 1990).

Unlike what proponents of psycho-dynamic theories would argue, political orientations throughout childhood are still open to substantial change, according to proponents of social learning theories. This is because of the acquisition of new information, the exposure to a broader and more diversified environment, and the influence of major socializing agents like family, religion, school, and social class. In other words, political orientations should be much more static during childhood in a Psycho-Dynamic world. In a social learning world, how one thinks is a function of what surrounds them. The connection between the theories and my research is in regards to the social, economic, and cultural characteristics of the immigrants who resettled in the United States. These characteristics act as products and possible agents of political socialization.

What is crucial here is first to identify the norms, values, and beliefs of Filipino and Vietnamese immigrants, and then determine whether such values are rooted in tradition or are more reactive to their present environment (i.e. assimilation). Moreover, one must also consider how effective these ethnic groups

are in transferring these values on to their children. For all first, 1.5, and second

generation Americans, some behavior and attitudes in America are consistent with

those espoused in the "motherland," while other behaviors and attitudes are in

conflict with each other. Thus, the question here is to determine what the

implications are for political ideology under these different situations. Nevertheless,

culture has a profound impact in shaping political ideology, even as its members

migrate to different parts of the world. For immigrants and their offspring,

communities exist to teach and reinforce the culture of their ancestors', birth nation.

Cognitive Development Theories

Another school of pre-adult socialization takes into consideration the

cognitive capabilities of the child. These theories look at how the individual reacts to

the environment, which takes into consideration both the rewards and punishments

delivered by the environment as well as the cognitive processes of the individual

which may be rooted by events in early childhood. In a rough sense, these theories

are a conflation of psycho-dynamic and social learning theories. However, in the

cognitive development model, the individual makes a decision based on his overall

assessment of the situation and is not strictly limited to what the rewards and

punishments might be.

According to Bar-Tel and Saxe (1990), the necessary conditions for the

acquisition of political knowledge are its availability and relevance. Cognitive

capabilities and epistemic motivations greatly influence the acquisition of political

knowledge, and that an individual's epistemic authority exerts a deterministic

influence on the acquisition of political knowledge. Piaget's theory of cognitive

development asserts that learning is an outcome of an intersection between two

events: an environmental event and the individuals' response to that event (Piaget

1970). Thus, in addition to socializing agents, which proponents of social learning

theories pin their explanations of political socialization, proponents of cognitive

development theories argue that one must also consider the "cognitive processes" of

the individual—how one responds to the environmental event. Cognitive processes

occur when representations of past environmental events or "schemas" are used

which enable the person to organize and act on future interactions with environmental

events. Thus outside stimuli are themselves not enough in socialization process,

according to proponents of cognitive development theories. How one synthesizes

such events is just as important. There are two types of cognitive processes Piaget

(1970) identifies: assimilation, which is the process by which new information is

incorporated into the schema without altering the schema, and accommodation, which

is a process in which new information causes a change in a schema. In other words,

one uses his understanding of history and new information to "map out" future action.

In assimilation, one's understanding does not change in the presence of new

information, whereas in accommodation, one's understanding does change (see

Torney-Purta 1990). Research on cognitive development theories tends to draw from

studies of older children and adolescents. By contrast, psycho-dynamic research is

oriented towards early childhood, with social learning research focusing on children aged somewhere in between.

Proponents of cognitive development "school" criticize the findings of the social learning research performed in the early to mid 1960s. This was because many of the studies' cases who had held positive views of politics and government as young children, had become participants in mass protests during late adolescence and early adulthood by the late 1960s (Renshon 1974, Renshon 1975). It would be erroneous, however, to assume that all of these people had gone through such a radical transformation in their political behavior: there were significant numbers of teens and young adults who maintain positive views of government through the 1960s and 70s and did not protest (see Jennings 2002). Thus, some chose to protest, while others did not. The point here is that the decision to protest stems from individuals reacting to the political environment of the 1960s and 70s, and not from their yielding to societal pressure. This is what differentiates Cognitive Development from Social Learning. Moreover, proponents of Cognitive Development, more so than proponents of Social Learning, downplay the impact of family, school, class, and other socializing agents on the individual (Jennings and Niemi 1968, Adelson 1971, Schwartz 1975).

Renshon accepts the idea that younger children develop positive orientations towards political objects, but explains that the growing cynicism expressed by older children and adolescents stems from a growing cognitive and behavioral dimension, nonexistent among young children. Renshon also argues that a child learns basic beliefs about the world as a result of an interplay between his own basic needs and his

level of satisfaction, or lack thereof, in a social context. "Basic beliefs" are a set of

assumptions about the nature of reality and the world in which one lives (Renshon

1975). This may be a crucial point, because my research focuses on political

ideology, which can be seen as a byproduct of one's basic beliefs. Thus, it might be

the case that until the individual's cognitive and behavioral processes have

sufficiently grown and matured—presumably in adolescence or early adulthood—

only then can the true nature of one's political ideology be determined. Further

studies have also downplayed the impact of socializing agents. Jennings and Niemi

(1968) showed that while the transmission of party identification from parent to child

was strong, transmission of other political orientations (i.e. candidate preferences or

issue stances) were significantly weaker. Schwartz's (1975) study of high school

students showed personal and political cynicism to intensify greatly in adolescence,

only to slow by early adulthood.

Cognitive development theories can be, in a rough sense, a conflation of

psycho-dynamic and social learning theories. How one defines basic beliefs is

heavily influenced by one's own psychology. Specifically, how insecure,

conservative, or deviant one is, can shape basic beliefs. In making this point, I allude

to the birth order work of Schacter (1959) and Adler (1931). At the same time, in

order for one to develop workable schemas to respond to environmental events, it is

necessary for the individual to have already experienced previous events, and have

them subsequently organized in the person's mind. While this theory is richer than

either social learning or psycho-dynamic theories, it will likely be the most difficult to

measure in my research. After all, how does one identify, let alone transcribe or run a regression analysis on a thought process? By contrast, socializing agents—family, education, religion, class among others—can be identified, and are the bases of the hypotheses affecting political ideology. While I acknowledge that this will make generating and testing hypotheses more difficult, my hope is that data from in depth interviews might uncover thought processes, or at the very least provide grounds for creating models of thoughts processes. For example, one might be able to infer accommodation or assimilation schemas based on common experiences. Even then, there is a question about whether such inferences can be made given modest interview sample sizes and numerous variables being considered—a degrees of freedom problem.

One example of how Cognitive Development theories can explain political socialization is the decision to emigrate. The conditions leading to emigration from Asia are themselves potential socializing agents--for example, unemployment may be due to failed economic policies, political persecution, and war. Yet, the decision to emigrate was not universally espoused by residents in Vietnam or the Philippines. Some individuals surmised that the quality of life would improve through permanent resettlement overseas, while others did not. In a sense, individual responses to the decision to emigrate varied among Filipinos and Vietnamese, despite the exposure to similar environmental events in the two respective countries. How distinct individuals come to calculate the costs and benefits of emigration is as important as any over-riding push factor that affects the entire group. The schema—the

individual's response to environmental events—can be developed during childhood,

even though the event might have recurred or continued on through adulthood.

Research in cognitive development suggests that one is best able to measure the

political orientations of people at a time when those views are relatively stable.

Proponents argue that time to be around late adolescence, for such begins the era in

one's life when people begin to think for themselves.

ADULT POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION THEORIES

In the socialization literature, there are three general theories of adult political

socialization that might ultimately explain the formation of one's political ideology,

based on conditions that are either societal-level, ethnic group-level, or individual

level. The taxonomy is paraphrased from Dawson, Prewitt, and Dawson (1977).

Systemic Level Conditions of Changes

These refer to situations which affect all Americans and could subsequently lead to

shifts in political ideology among adults. Because all Americans adults are affected,

so is the environment that Asian Americans must operate in.

Group Level Conditions or Changes

These refer to situations which primarily affect one group. For the purposes of this project, the affected group concerned here could be ethnic-based or nativity-based. Political attitudes reflect how a particular group reacts to these changes or conditions.

Individual Level Conditions or Changes

Conditions that primarily affect an individual, but are significant because such changes are replicated by many individuals. The consequences of such condition shape political attitudes overall.

For groups where the effects and after-effects of immigration mattered, theories of adult political socialization provide more viable explanations. One objective of the present project is to examine factors that shape the political learning processes, focusing primarily on events and stimuli that occurred when the respondents were adults. If adult socialization theories are valid, then the bases of political ideology can be traced to significant or profound experiences occurring in the respondent's adulthood, or perhaps late adolescence. Because this development occurred in the same place (the United States), there should be no profound and/or distinct experiences between first, 1.5, and second generation Asian Americans.

THE VIABILITY OF ADULT SOCIALIZATION THEORIES

The argument made by proponents of pre-adult socialization is that political orientations are shaped in childhood. Schwartz (1975) points out in her research that levels of political and personal cynicism began to stabilize by early adulthood, after intense increases during adolescence. The Pollyanna youngster who looked at the government with reverence in the early 1960s, who became the energetic radical in the early 1970s, is then transformed into the materialistic young, urban professional by the 1980s. This transformation of one political orientation, assumed to have ended upon reaching adulthood, goes through yet another transformation. When does it all end? Or does it?

The limitations of childhood socialization, according to Jaros (1973) are that such theories do not consider "generational" and "maturational" changes in society.

Generational Changes

Generational changes reflect a paradigmatic shift between older adults and younger adults. To be clear, the term "generation" referred to in Jaros's (1973) study is consistent with the framework discussed in Mannheim's (1951) essay, but differs from the term "generation" I use to categorize Asian American nativity groups. Jaros uses the example of the voter demographics of the Democratic Party from the 1930s to the 1950s to illustrate his point. During the 1930s and 40s, an overwhelming number of young voters identified with the Democratic Party. Since the party was ideologically more liberal than the Republican, it was assumed that younger voters

were more likely to become Democrats. However, by the 1950s, the number of

young voters who were Democrats dropped significantly, while the older

Democrats—those who first registered in the 1930s and 40s—continued to support

the party. Jaros concludes that the Democratic shift in the 1930s reflected system-

level changes: a reaction to the Great Depression and World War II.

Inglehart (1977) believes that system level changes alter individual level

changes. which then "affects one's orientation towards political issues," (p. 7)

although how system-level changes transpire in a post-industrial world is difficult to

conceptualize. This is because in a post-industrial, post-materialist world, liberal and

conservative ideologies are harder to define. Thus, it becomes more difficult for

political parties to define themselves; classical definitions like economic interest,

which explain Jaros's findings, have become less relevant today. Inglehart argues that

"formative experiences" at the systemic level that affect the whole generation seem to

be the most important in changing societal goals and individual values. In turn,

"change in individual values affects one's orientation toward political issues"

(Inglehart 1977 p. 12). This is all accomplished because the impact of these

formative experiences--i.e. economic recession, credit crisis, global warming--are

"mediated by the communications network surrounding a given individual" (Inglehart

1977 p.97). Given the vastness and speed of today's media, information can be

acquired easily by adults, which could then be used to re-evaluate political values that

may have originated in childhood and formulate new political opinions. Inglehart

also describes education as a "formative influence" where post-materialist values are

deliberately instilled (p.75). The implication is that one's education (or lack thereof in the United States) conditions how much one is able to utilize the media to acquire political information. The role of media as a potential agent of political socialization and the education levels of the respondents will be investigated in this project.

While Inglehart's study focused on industrialized Western democracies, Jennings (2007) cited "a changing world order," which "provided a natural laboratory for examining the processes and outcomes of political socialization…the opening up of these societies has also made it possible to undertake relevant research" (p. 32). The Jennings (2002) study points out that the differences in political ideology and level of political participation were greater between the 1965 high school graduates who were "protestors" and their family than they were between these "protestors" and their offspring. Thus politically active parents seem better able to imprint their political views. In this context, the effect of "generational" change (as Jaros defines it) is relatively weak. By contrast, relatively apolitical parents, and the volatile conditions and changes of the 1960s and 70s, left a profound imprint on the protestors of that time; the combination of which cultivated a "politically active" offspring group. Here the "generational" effects are much more profound. This project investigates attitudinal differences based on ethnicity and nativity to determine whether "generational effects" (as Jaros defines them) exist; the relevant system-level "condition or change" investigated in this project is immigration.

Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2002) also make the case for adult political socialization in some individuals. They conclude that "children who acquire political

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predispositions early in life from their parents are more stable in their early adulthood than are those who 'leave home without it'….By contrast, those whose socialization in childhood is weak show much more instability well into the adult years. They exhibit a delayed pattern of political development, one where crystallized positions are slow to develop (and) one (is) more susceptible to influences outside the childhood home." (p. 21-22)

In dealing with issues regarding the phases of socialization and the ages upon which the respondents experience them, I acknowledge that one of the major concerns in this study is that the second generation Asian American Groups will be considerably younger that the first generation. Thus, age will be considered in assessing inter-group (both ethnic and nativity) comparisons, where appropriate.

Maturational Changes

Maturational change reflects changes in the psychological attributes of or environmental conditions surrounding the individual. These changes manifest a change in political orientation that occurs during adulthood, but is fueled by changes in the conditions of the individual, such as personal feelings of oppression or economic deprivation. According to Keniston (1968), radicals came primarily from structurally stable, privileged backgrounds. Their families were either liberal but not radical, or apolitical. Jennings (2002) confirms "the connecting tissue of liberal orientations" in his three-generation study of 1965 high school graduates who

protested, the graduates' parents, and the graduates' offspring (p. 318). Participation

stems from one being exposed to such activities in the first place—for example, by

school, friends, or acquaintances who are already involved in such activities.

Keniston goes on to point out that there is a lag of years between an individual joining

a radical organization and then identifying as a radical. Thus the individual process

of becoming a radical occurs during adulthood, and is triggered by environmental

events at that time.

Put another way, the socialization process, defined as "maturational change"

can be seen as a form of cognitive development occurring in adults. Moreover,

socializing agents such as school, which were critical in shaping perspectives of

governments among younger children, apparently maintain their socializing powers

among young adults. An early illustration of this is the Bennington College Study

(1935-39), which discovered that college students became increasingly liberal as they

progressed through school. Similar findings appear in Edelstein's (1962) study of

University of Washington students. Even among older political elites and officials,

conducted by Kornberg and Thomas (1965), it was concluded that political

socialization can occur in later stages of life, with family playing a very prominent

socializing role. Thus, higher education and (by extension) economic class positions

are examples of maturational changes in adulthood, because the change occurs in the

individual, not in the group or society overall.

If the process of political socialization can result in fundamental changes in

political orientations during adulthood, it is necessary to find out what environmental

events can ignite such a change. For example, Hoskin's (1989) work looking at the

socialization of adult immigrants posits questions that cannot be easily addressed by

proponents of Pre-Adult socialization. The economic and political contexts behind

emigration, resettlement, and acculturation are powerful socializing agents that

extend well past childhood. After all, the decision to leave the motherland and

relocate in a new part of the world has a profound psychological impact on adults and

children. They must all undergo the process of adjusting to the way of life in the host

country. For adult immigrants, the implication is that they will have to go through a

political "re-orientation" in their new home, rather than a "crystallization" of their

political orientation that is purported to occur, according to advocates of pre-adult

socialization.

Campbell (2006) explains that social networks in homogeneous communities

are a "function of partisan composition of one's wider community" (p.76). As adults,

individuals become like-minded with the people that they associate or interact with.

For this reason, this project will investigate the role of ethnic enclaves on political

socialization.

It is important to note that most of the studies cited this review comes from

studies in the 1960s and early 1970s, as well as recent scholarship since the 1990s.

Jennings (2007) explains that "only a few publications devoted explicitly to pre-

adults appeared between the mid 1970s and the early 1990s" (p. 29). Childhood

studies virtually disappeared in the 1970s for three reasons: political scientists were

not interested in investigating children, the benign views of 1960s children

transformed into the volatile views in the social unrest in the 1970s, and the political

scandals and upheaval in the 1970s illustrated how views of children could change

dramatically during adulthood.

Conversely, adult socialization studies did begin to flourish in the late 1970s

when there were considerable studies involving immigration and their assimilation

(Hoskin 1989). Given the large influx of immigrants since the 1970s due to

economic and political forces, researchers began investigating the political

socialization of adults who resettled in the United States (see Arguelles 1982, Garcia

1981, Guzman 1976). While many of these studies concentrate on immigrants from

Latin America, my research intends to build on the political socialization literature by

looking at Asian American immigrants. In the next chapter, I present a historical

analysis of the political and economic contexts associated with Filipino and

Vietnamese immigration to the United States

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The purposes of this chapter are to explain the selection of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans in this project, to provide a historical context of their immigration to the United States, and to describe the methodology used to investigate the political socialization of these immigrants and their offspring. Given the complexity of different generations and the time and resource constraints, I chose to narrow my comparisons to two ethnic groups. This project draws from existing quantitative data and 173 in-depth interviews of Filipino and Vietnamese Americans, which I conducted. Later, I will explain the value of quantitative and qualitative methods for this project.

According to the 2000 U.S. Census, there were almost 11.9 million Asian Americans in the United States, including 1.66 million people who identified with other races, comprising 4.2% of the total U.S. population. This figure represents a 72.2% population increase over the 1990 U.S. Census, compared with the 13.2% increase of the overall American population (U.S. Bureau of Census 2000). There were 2.88 Chinese Americans, 2.36 million Filipino Americans (1.22 million were foreign-born), 1.89 Asian Indian Americans, 1.23 million Korean Americans, 1.22 Vietnamese Americans (of which 0.86 million were foreign-born), and 1.15 million Japanese Americans. In California, Asian Americans comprise more than 12% of the state's population, about 4.16 million (U.S. Department of Commerce 2002).

The Asian American population surge can be attributed to high levels of immigration, particularly from India, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Korean

immigration to the United States soared in the 1970s and early 1980s, but began to taper off by the late 1980s. Japanese immigration rates to the United States since the 1960s have been much smaller compared to other Asian groups. Still the presence of Asian Americans in society is significant, and their numbers are growing rapidly.

SELECTION OF CASES: FILIPINO AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE AMERICANS

Given the size and enormity of Asia, there are dozens of Asian ethnic groups; and many of its members now permanently reside in the United States. However, for practical purposes, it is necessary to reduce the number of Asian American ethnic groups that would be studied in this project. Otherwise, comparisons between ethnic groups become too unwieldy and too confusing to make and follow. Furthermore, limitations in time and resources would make it difficult for me to adequately examine more than two Asian American groups.

The following criteria were used to determine which ethnic groups would be included in the study:

1. The American born and Asian born population of the Asian American ethnic groups had to be large enough to warrant intensive study.

2. Immigration flows from the Asian sending country to the United States had to remain consistently high from the 1970s through today, to ensure that there is an adequate number of 1.5 generation Asian American samples.

<u>Narrowing Down the Groups for Study</u>

Laotian Americans, Hmong Americans, Cambodian Americans, and smaller Asian American communities are not included due to their relatively low population figures. Japanese Americans, despite a significant overall population, do not have a large foreign-born population. Japan's economic strength and political openness in Japan are the reason for the lack of immigration. Korean Americans, despite a significant overall population and foreign born population, do not have a large 1.5 generation population. This is because, since the late 1980s, Korean immigration to the United States has dropped significantly. Furthermore, there has been a reverse migration phenomenon, where immigrants Korean Americans are moving back to South Korea (Lien 2003). This is due to increased economic opportunities and political democratization in the country, as well as deteriorating race relations between Korean American and African American communities in the 1980s and 1990s.

The problem with using Chinese Americans in this project is that one would have to distinguish those who came, or whose parents came, from Taiwan, Hong Kong or Mainland China, because the political conditions differ significantly. Having to create Chinese American "subgroups" to account for the geographical, political, and socio-economic differences would result in sample sizes, especially in the Taiwanese and Hong Kong Chinese subgroups, that would be too small for

meaningful analysis. On the other hand, combining all Chinese sub-groups, would disregard British rule over Hong Kong and Taiwan's "semi-autonomous" status.

Filipino Americans, Vietnamese Americans, and Asian Indian Americans have significant overall, first generation, 1.5 generation, and second generation populations. Filipino immigration and Asian Indian immigration to the Unites States has been consistently high since the early 1970s. Vietnamese immigration levels have been consistently high since the late 1970s. While achieving upward economic mobility was a reason behind the immigration of all three ethnic groups to the United States—not to mention most immigrant groups from around the world—the exclusion of Asian Indian Americans from this project stems from the fact that the political landscape in India was not a major reason for immigration to the United States, though I concede that persecution of Sikh and Muslim minorities might explain their emigration. For Vietnamese and Filipinos, Communism and Marcos Authoritarianism, respectively, were political factors that explained both emigration from Asia and their arrival to the United States. Thus, a comparison of these two groups would be ideal. Still, despite the large and increasing numbers of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans who came for political and economic reasons, the circumstances behind their arrival to America were quite different, and it is necessary to uncover what those circumstances were.

Finally, I should also note that have a personal interest in this comparison. As a second generation Filipino American with a background in political science, I have an intellectual curiosity about the political behavior of people from the same ethnic

group. Also, I have had the opportunity to study under and work with Sucheng Chan, who instructed me in the history of Southeast Asian Americans--specifically, ethnic Vietnamese, Lao, Hmong, and Cambodians. I had the good fortune of teaching a course in Vietnamese American history at U.C. Santa Barbara in 2001 as part of the Asian American Studies curriculum. My background in Vietnamese American history is a complement to my interest in Filipino American political behavior.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF FILIPINO AND VIETNAMESE IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

The context of Filipino and Vietnamese immigration to the United States is a major consideration in understanding how mass political attitudes might have been formed for both ethnic communities. This is because not all Filipinos or Vietnamese who wanted to immigrate to the United States could do so. Indeed there were certain social, cultural, and economic characteristics shared among Filipino (Sycip and Fawcett 1988) and Vietnamese (Rutledge 1992) co-ethnics who permanently resettled in the United States, and those who remained in Asia. Moreover, some of these characteristics were shared between first generation, 1.5 generation, and second generation co-ethnics. Understanding the context of immigration is important because it outlines the environment that the first and 1.5 generation Asian Americans were exposed to, and it outlines the environment that the second generation was relatively insulated from.

The 1965 Immigration act stipulated that spouses and minor children (under 21 years of age) of U.S. permanent residents, adult children of U.S. citizens, skilled professionals, and siblings of U.S. citizens could immigrate to the United States. The immigration quota was 20,000 per year per sending country, and a quota ceiling was given for each immigration "preference" group. This annual immigration quota was later increased to 25,620 in 1990. However, spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens could immigrate to the United States outside of these preference groups, and did not count against immigration quotas (Keely 1973). These are some reasons why the number of Filipinos immigrating to the United States since the 1970s far exceeds 20,000 per year (Chan 1991). Similar overflows above formal immigration quotas have been experienced by Vietnamese Americans since the early 1980s (Nakanishi and Lai 2003).

Filipino Immigration to the United States

American immigration policies made it relatively easier for Filipinos to immigrate to the United States if they had high levels of education or were members of the American military; the latter groups were most commonly stewards in the U.S. Navy (Pernia, 1976, Allen 1977, Carino 1987, Liu, Ong, and Rosenstein 1991).

Until 1992, Filipinos in the Philippines could also use U.S. military enlistment as a means of expediting the process to gain American citizenship (Chan 1991, Posadas 1999). This immigration channel began in World War II with Filipinos who

served under the United States Armed Forces of the Far East, USAFFE (Santos 1942). Later, in 1947, the United States and the newly independent Philippine governments signed the Military Bases Agreement, which continued the process of allowing about 2,000 Filipinos each year to enlist in the U.S. military and gain U.S. citizenship (Quinsaat 1974, Allen 1977). Many of these servicemen, upon acquisition of citizenship, immigrated to the United States with their immediate families, and thus were outside immigration quotas (see Espiritu 1995).

In the 1970s and 1980s, the pace of Filipino immigration intensified as a result of economic malaise and anti-authoritarian sentiments during the 1965-1986 Ferdinand Marcos regime. In September 1972, about one year before he was to leave office due to term limits, President Ferdinand Marcos dissolved government and declared martial law in the Philippines. Marcos argued that this declaration was necessary given the increased threat of communism in the region and the political instability in the country caused by mass protests. Critics argued that Marcos was a tyrant, unwilling to relinquish power (Bello and Reyes 1986-87, Posadas 1999). Filipino immigration in the 1970s and 80s was also fueled by the dreary Philippine socio-economic situation, which coincided with the liberalization of American immigration policy.

Marcos's plan to industrialize via import substitution was a disaster. Land reform policies which had been crucial in facilitating the development of the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese economies were never implemented by Marcos (David 1980, Bello and Reyes 1986-87). With the Philippines in an economic

malaise as neighboring countries became wealthier, Filipinos and Filipinas—with the encouragement of the Marcos administration—began to look for work in other countries: some as overseas contract workers in Asia and the Middle East, others as resettled immigrants in developed countries like the United States and Canada (Joyce and Hunt 1982, Chang 1997). What was especially tragic about the Philippine economic situation is that the Philippines has had relatively high levels of literacy, English fluency, and educational attainment, a reflection of American colonial influence on the Philippine educational system. However, while the education system produced a significant number of college graduates, the economic system in the Philippines was unable to absorb these people (Paredes 1990). The resulting outflow of skilled and educated emigrants overseas is known as the "brain drain" effect (Pido 1977, Joyce and Hunt 1982).

However, these "brain drain" emigrants would not have had the opportunity to immigrate to the United States had it not been for the enactment of the 1965 Immigration Act, which raised the annual quota of immigrants for each sending country to 20,000. The Philippine immigration quota to the United States was 50 per year from 1934 to 1946 as a result of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and about 100-200 per year, from 1946 to 1965 as a result of the Luce-Cellar Act. The 1965 Immigration Act attempted to attract immigrants who had job skills that were scarce in the United States, and those who wished to reunite with family members in the United States who were either permanent residents or U.S. citizens (DeJong, Root and Abad 1986, Arnold, Carino, Fawcett, and Park 1989). The former category was

particularly crucial, given the shortage of skilled laborers in the United States in the 1960s and 70s in the health professional and education fields as well as the defense industry. Filipino immigrant labor was particularly desirable because, unlike most other immigrant sending countries, Filipinos were fluent in English.

Thus, in order to understand the context of Filipino immigration to the United States, one must look at the push factors (influences that motivated residents to emigrate and resettle in a particular country) of migration. For Filipino immigrants, political opposition and disenchantment with an authoritarian regime and the inability of the Philippine economy to absorb its educated and skilled labor were push factors for emigration to the United States and other countries. On the other hand, the 1965 Immigration Act, and the demand for skilled labor in America, particularly in the technical, educational, and health professional fields were factors that "pulled" Filipino immigrants to the United States. In addition, military enlistment was another platform by which Filipinos could gain passage to America. This was especially the case for immigrant Filipino American males between the 1960s and 1980s. Moreover, Filipino immigration via American military enlistment, which led to subsequent waves of immigration by their family members, explains the relatively large concentrations of Filipino Americans in current or former naval hubs of California such as San Diego, Oxnard, Vallejo, and Alameda.

Vietnamese Immigration to the United States

As for the Vietnamese, American immigration policy was much more complicated. In the late 1970s the U.S. government openly and quickly admitted refugees from the Second Indochina War (1964-75), mainly middle and high ranking officials who had been involved with either the South Vietnamese or American governments prior to the fall of Saigon to the communists on April 30, 1975 (Liu et al 1979, Loescher and Scanlon 1986). In addition, there was a substantial ethnic Chinese merchant class living in South Vietnam that feared persecution by the new Communist regime and left between 1976 and 1978 (Hiebert 1979, Freeman 1995). Despite the large numbers of Vietnamese immigrants in these two initial waves, the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese immigration to the United States in the 1970s and 80s were composed of "boat people" (Chan 1991, Robinson 1998). These were Vietnamese who escaped the country on crowded, rickety boats and attempted to reach the shores of non-communist neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Between 1975 and 1989 (with the peak of the exodus occurring between 1978 and 1981), about 500,000 Vietnamese boat people successfully reached neighboring countries and were subsequently housed in refugee camps, operated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR). However, the death rate of these aspiring escapees due to starvation, disease, and piracy was estimated at 50% or higher. To put that in perspective, in the early 1970s, the population of South Vietnam was estimated at about 22 million (Chan 1991, Freeman 1995).

By the early 1980s, the influx of refugees by the early 1980s had taken a

significant financial and psychological toll on the receiving countries (Loescher and Scanlon 1986, Freeman 1995, Robinson, 1998). The financial toll stemmed from the fact that the new refugees disproportionately utilized government programs and services at a time of worldwide economic recession. Still, the governments of Western receiving nations, especially the United States, felt compelled to do something for the Vietnamese who had fought alongside the United States in a proxy war against the spread of communism. Yet, by giving these emigrants support and opportunities to permanently resettle, receiving nations were creating what Michael Teitelbaum (see Robinson 1998) called a "moral hazard," meaning that the support receiving nations were giving the new emigrants encouraged future emigration.

By the 1980s, the cost of providing this international support had become too steep. Psychologically, the immigrants were a growing reminder that the communists defeated pro-Western forces. The financial and psychological weariness expressed by receiving countries has been referred to as "compassion fatigue" (Robinson 1998). With compassion fatigue brewing, the United States and international community implemented the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) policy in 1989 to deal with the Vietnamese resettlement question and curb the exodus (Freeman 1995, Robinson 1998). Exceptions were made for Amerasians (offspring of American military personnel and Vietnamese mothers) and for those who could prove that they were bona fide refugees and not simply economic migrants. In other words, potential migrants had to show evidence that they would be persecuted if they remained in Vietnam. Prior to the imposition of the CPA in 1989, any Vietnamese who made it

into one of the UNHCR camps were automatically assumed to be refugees (Chan 1991), even if there was no proof that they would be persecuted. Before 1996, refugee status was the only immigration preference category by which Vietnamese immigrants could enter and permanently resettle in the United States. Afterwards, once the United States normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam, family reunification preferences became a vehicle for Vietnamese immigration. This form of immigration has surged in the last ten years (Nakanishi and Lai 2003).

In order to understand the context of Vietnamese immigration, it is crucial to understand the general socio-economic characteristics of the different waves of immigrants. The first two waves—the April 1975 evacuees and the exodus of Chinese-Vietnamese merchants in 1976-78—tended to have higher levels of education, and were therefore much more able to improve their own socio-economic situation when they came to the United States (Freeman 1995). Moreover, levels of English fluency were the highest among the April 1975 wave as a substantial number of these immigrants worked as officials of the U.S. government. The later wave of Vietnamese immigrants—the boat people, the Amerasians, and their family members who immigrated to the United States since the late 1980s—tended to have lower levels of education and English fluency, and their attempts to improve their economic situation in the United States have been relatively less successful (Chan 1991).

While the result of Vietnamese immigration to the United States has produced a bimodal, socio-economic distribution in the Vietnamese-American community, the push factor of Vietnamese emigration overall has been the fear, distrust, and failures

of the communist government (Hawthorne 1982). The pull factor of immigration

originates from the American containment policy of Communism and its failed

attempt to preserve an anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam, culminating with

the Second Indochina War. It was President Ford who exercised executive parole

authority, which enabled 125,000 Vietnamese to be resettled in the United States

around the time of the fall of Saigon. President Carter likewise exercised parole

authority to enable more than 200,000 more Vietnamese permanently to resettle in the

United States. In 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act, which established annual

worldwide refugee quotas for immigration at 50,000 per year (Kennedy 1981).

However, enforcement of this act was not strict and the actual immigration numbers

regularly exceeded the prescribed ceilings throughout the 1980s.

Given the efforts of South Vietnamese who joined the Americans in fighting

communism, there was a sentiment that the U.S. government had an obligation to

help these people after the fall of Saigon (Loescher and Scanlon 1986). This sense of

obligation by the American government—though not exactly the American people

(Stern 1981)—was not limited to South Vietnamese government officials and elites,

but was extended—at least until the mid-1980s—to all the South Vietnamese people.

METHODOLOGY

The first part of my research project involves the secondary analysis of

existing surveys, which assesses the political ideology of Vietnamese Americans and

Filipino Americans. The second part of the project uses in-depth interviews of first, 1.5, and second generation Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans to examine how the process of political socialization transpires. There are three types of group comparisons that I investigate:

1. I compare political attitudes of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans overall

2. I compare political attitudes of first generation, 1.5 generation, and second generation Asian Americans

3. I compare political attitudes of first generation, 1.5 generation, and second generation Filipino Americans with similar cohorts of Vietnamese Americans.

More specifically, I look for similarities and differences in relevant factors of political socialization between the groups. Once I identified them, the research "puzzle" was to explain why these similarities and differences exist. Here is where the in-depth interviews provide some possible explanations.

Analysis of Existing Survey Data

I will analyze the following survey data reports

1. Pilot Study of the National Asian American Survey (2001)

The PNAAP surveyed 137 Vietnamese and 266 Filipino Americans from

California, New York, Illinois, and Hawaii.. This survey asked respondents to report on their socio-economic characteristics, political attitudes, and levels of political participation. Random sampling from of a list of Asian surnames was used to draw the survey sample. The respondents had the option to be interviewed in their home language or in English. The survey asks questions regarding political attitudes, social-economic characteristics and nativity (see Lien 2001, Lien et al 2001, and Lien 2003). In this paper, I am reporting the results from Lien and her colleagues' analyses of the PNAAP results.

2. <u>Los Angeles Times Surveys #331(March/April1994) and #370(December 1995)</u>

Beginning in 1992, The Los Angeles Times conducted a series of surveys of different Asian American ethnic groups in Southern California. These surveys drew from a pool of residents from six different counties: Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura counties. Sampling of respondents was done through random sampling of ethnic surnames from phone lists in these six counties. The surveys were conducted by telephone either in English or in the respondents' home language. The respondents of the surveys were all at least 18 years in age. There were 750 Vietnamese American respondents and 861 Filipino American respondents who participated in the surveys. In this paper, I am using the results reported by Lien (2003) and Lai et al (2003) in their analyses of the <u>Los Angeles Times</u> surveys.

In-Depth Interviews

One of the main goals of this research project is to determine how nativity affects one's political ideology. I conducted a series of interviews among first, 1.5, and second generation Vietnamese and Filipino Americans between July 2004 and August 2005. The interviews asked the subjects which factors mattered in the formation of the subjects' political ideology. Moreover, the subjects were asked to include factors not posited by the researcher, which they felt contributed to the formation of their political ideologies. I use the depth interviews to show how factors of socialization affect the subjects' positions on various political issues.

Appendices 1 and 2 show the interview schedule and procedure used in conducting the interviews of Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans. The subjects were given a letter explaining the nature of the project and information about what to expect from the interview. I began the interview with some preparatory comments. I audiotaped the interview while taking hand notes at the same time. No interviewees objected to the audiotaping. For 10 of the interviewees (all first generation Vietnamese Americans), family members helped with translating questions and responses during the interviews. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the demographics of the interview pool. I interviewed 107 Filipino Americans and 66 Vietnamese Americans. The participants were chosen by a snowball sampling method beginning with parishioners from local Catholic churches in the metro-San

Diego area, and eight former students from U.C. Santa Barbara.

Filipino Americans
Table 3.1 Demographics of Filipino Americans Interviewed

Gender Breakdown
Male: 48 (44.9%)
Female: 59 (55.1%)

Generational Breakdown
First: 56 (52.3%)
1.5: 33 (30.8%)
Second: 18 (16.8%)

Education Breakdown
Less than High School: 0 (0%)
High School & Some College: 45 (42.1%)
College Degree or Higher: 62 (57.9%)

Vietnamese Americans
Table 3.2 Demographics of Vietnamese Americans Interviewed

Gender Breakdown
Male: 22 (33.3%)
Female: 44 (66.7%)

Generation Breakdown
First: 35(53.0%)
1.5: 12 (18.2%)
Second: 19 (28.8%)

Education Breakdown
Less than High School: 4 (6.0%)
High School & Some College: 38 (57.6%)
College Degree or Higher: 24 (36.4%)

In addition, I asked the subjects a series of questions regarding their views on a wide range of political issues, having them rate their position on each issue on a scale of 1 to 5. I decided not to report these quantitative results in the tables because the scores are not generalizable to the entire Vietnamese or Filipino American population, unlike the results reported by the Los Angeles Times or the Pilot Study of the National Asian American Political Survey. There are three shortcomings with my quantitative data: First, my sample size was smaller than the aforementioned national surveys. Second, the sampling method I used for the interview portion of my research was not probabilistic; I used a snowball sampling method. Third, the interview pool was composed mostly of residents in Southern California, and therefore does not take into account possible bias associated with living in different regions of the United States.

CAUTIONARY NOTE ON OFFSPRING REPORTS OF PARENTAL ATTITUDES

In this project, respondents are asked to compare their political beliefs with those of their parents (see Chapters 5 and 6 and the sections on the transmission of cultural norms from parent to child). The information on parental attitudes is reported by the respondents and not their parents, which may lead to issues of reliability. Kent Tedin (1976) discussed in his study of 322 parent-adolescent dyads in Iowa concluded that "reports of parental issue and candidate evaluations are not valid substitutes for independent parent interviews. The reliability of these reports...ranges

from low to moderate, and the reporting errors are strongly biased by the adolescents' own political attitude" (Tedin 1976 p. 123). On the other hand, Tedin's research concludes that adolescent reporting on their parents' party identification, partisan direction of the vote, and presidential candidate choice is reliable, which confirms similar findings by Niemi (1974).

Although the reliability of the information on parental attitudes on political issues, as reported by the respondents, might also be questionable, it is important to note that most Filipino American respondents tended to be more ideologically consistent with their parents than Vietnamese American respondents (see tables 5.2 and 6.2), based on the reporting of the respondents themselves. So then even if there are issues in the reliability of reported parental information by the respondents, the question that needs to be considered here is how come Filipino American respondents voiced their relative agreement with their parents, while Vietnamese American respondents did not? Chapters 5 and 6 will shed light towards a possible explanation for this question. Also, there is a distinction between mischaracterizing parental positions on a variety of political issues and reporting that parents are disinterested in politics all together. So while the respondents might be relatively inaccurate in evaluating parental positions on specific political issues or on attitudes towards local politicians, the respondent might be more accurate in evaluating parental interest in American politics. Furthermore, Tedin's study examined the reported information of adolescents, while I draw on information from adults. It is possible that older respondents might be more accurate in their assessment of their parents' position on

political issues.

SAMPLING METHODS: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The main advantage of using the random sampling method (as was the case in the NAAPS and the Los Angeles Times surveys) is that it makes the results less subject to bias, and thus more reliable and generalizable. Although the goal here with using in-depth interviews is not to create generalizable data, minimizing potential bias in the data that comes from these interviews is an important consideration. The two disadvantages of this method are that 1) it is expensive and 2) many Filipino surnames are Spanish, leading to potential incorrect selections of Hispanic Americans or omissions of Filipino Americans from the sample.

The main disadvantage of non-probabalistic sampling method of soliciting interviewees from the community organization is that there might be systematic bias associated with the selection of cases that might not be discovered by the researcher, and might ultimately affect the reliability of the data. The main advantages of this method are 1) the relatively lower financial costs, 2) the convenience of selecting cases in ethnic enclaves, and 3) the convenience of selecting cases in organizations and institutions relevant to this project, such as Catholic parishes, district associations (organizations based on regional areas where the immigrants and their ancestors lived in Asia), and other professional, social, and political organizations that are also ethnic based. In this project, I used ethnic-based organizations to find some of my interviewees.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPORTANCE OF SURVEY DATA AND WHAT IT CAN TELL US ABOUT FILIPINO AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE AMERICANS

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and interpret existing survey data about Vietnamese American and Filipino American political participation, socio-economic characteristics, and political party identification. The data suggest that there are numerous differences between Vietnamese Americans and Filipino Americans, which undermine the notion that Asian Americans are a homogenous group (see chapter 2). Later in this chapter, I offer hypotheses to explain why the differences between these two ethnic groups exist, how these differences help in the groups' political socialization, and break down the comparisons according to nativity. Existing quantitative data on Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans are still limited. Nevertheless, this project offers explanations and implications of the quantitative data available regarding Filipino American and Vietnamese American political behavior by analyzing how respondents in these groups are politically socialized.

Survey Analysis of Asian American Political Behavior: An Overview

Pei-Te Lien (1997, 2001) has done the groundbreaking work in this area. Her quantitative analysis involves the construction of models regarding Asian Americans' likelihood to vote, obtain naturalized citizenship, contact government officials, attend political functions, and (most relevant to my research) political attitudes. Her article

in the September 2001 issue of PS, in collaboration with Collet, Wong and Ramakrishnan, addressed these issues as well as party affiliation, broken down by ethnicity. Lien (2003) also used data from the <u>Los Angeles Times</u> surveys of different Asian American groups in order to assess how immigrant Filipino Americans, Korean Americans, and Vietnamese Americans are able to politically adapt. Wong (2003) examined political participation among Chinese American women in Southern California, using survey data from a 1997 <u>Los Angeles Times</u> survey of 773 Chinese residents.

My project complements Lien's work in that the focus entails looking at Asian American political behavior rather than specific organizations. However, my project is distinct from Lien's work in three major ways. First, my focus is more on the political ideology of Asian Americans than on political participation, citizenship intent, or naturalization. Second, my project seeks to uncover the systematic factors that may explain these ideological differences. And finally, my project seeks to determine whether these systematic factors, developed during childhood or adulthood, are influenced by one's nativity.

In addition to Lien's work, there have been other studies that have examined Asian American political behavior, specifically electoral behavior.

Lai, Cho, Kim and Takeda (Lai et al 2001) used survey work to break down campaign contributions by Asian American ethnic groups, discovering that Vietnamese Americans contributed to Republican candidates and political action committees in higher proportions than did Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans,

and Korean Americans. Nevertheless, the authors acknowledge that there is "little scholarly research on Asian American contributors."

Nakanishi (1986) decries that "knowledge of Asian American electoral behavior is highly preliminary" and suggests that more survey work, especially studies that break down for ethnicity and geographic areas, needs to be conducted. Nakanishi headed a team of researchers of the UCLA Asian American Voters Project, which conducted surveys measuring electoral characteristics among Asian Americans registered voters living in the "Asian Corridor" region of Los Angeles. He also cites a similar study conducted by Din (1984) in San Francisco's Chinatown, Richmond, and Sunset Districts. In both surveys, samples were drawn from Asian surnames in voter registration lists.

Though these studies are unrelated to my specific focus, they are worth mentioning because they are among the few existing studies regarding Asian American politics and illustrate the scarcity of literature in that field.

Comparing Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans

Survey data show that socio-economic disparities among Asian American ethnic groups do in fact exist. The quantitative data on Filipino and Vietnamese American socio-economic characteristics and political behavior that are cited here are from three surveys: the two Los Angeles Times surveys in 1994 (surveys #331 and #370) and the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (used in Lien and Lien et al, 2001). The Los Angeles Times surveyed 861 Vietnamese Americans and 750

Filipino Americans from six counties in Southern California. The PNAAP surveyed

137 Vietnamese and 266 Filipino Americans from California, New York, Illinois, and

Hawaii. The purpose of this section is to make certain comparisons between the two

groups in order to explain (or at least hypothesize) potential generational differences

between these ethnic groups, based on existing quantitative data.

Citizenship, Voter Registration, and Party Affiliation

While the focus of this project is to examine how socialization of one's

political ideology occurs, disparities in levels of citizenship and voter registration

might help explain why one ethnic group is more or less effective in transmitting their

political knowledge and ideology to their offspring. In other words, is it plausible

that higher levels of citizenship and voter registration are agents or products of

political socialization? The Los Angeles Times data indicate a large discrepancy in

the rates of voter registration and citizenship. A much larger proportion of Filipino

American are U.S. citizens and registered voters, than Vietnamese Americans (see

Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Los Angeles Times Survey Results

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
N=	861	750
(in %)		
Citizens	49	73
Registered Voters	29	50

Table 4.1 Continued

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
Reg. Democrats	24	40
Reg. Republicans	61	38
Reg. No Party/Ind.	13	17
Reg. Other Party	1	5

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
High School (or less)	51	13
Some College	29	27
College Graduate (or more)	30	60

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
$20K (or less)	51	9
$20-50K	35	48
$50K (or more)	14	43

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
Unemployed	10	3

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
Male/Female Ratio	52/48	45/55

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
Speak English Well/Very Well	68	95

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
Use English Media	37	77

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
Live w/Whites	36	22
Live w/Co-ethnics	11	14
Live w/other Asians	9	5
Live in Mixed	24	41

	Vietnamese	Filipinos
Intermarriage-Yes	51	75
Intermarriage-No	15	7

Source: Lien, Pei-Te, (data is from Los Angeles Times surveys #331[March/April 1994] and #370 [December 1995])

Table 4.1 shows the results from the Los Angeles Times surveys #331 and #370. Among registered Vietnamese American and Filipino American voters, another significant discrepancy emerges: party affiliation. Survey #331 showed that most of the Vietnamese American respondents were registered Republicans. Survey #370 showed that Filipino Americans respondents were evenly split among Republicans and Democrats. Ong and Lee (2001) showed similar trends in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Party Affiliation of Vietnamese and Filipino Americans

	Vietnamese	Filipino
Democrat	24	35
Republican	62	41
Other	14	25

Source: Ong, Paul M. and David E. Lee, (data is from surveys by the Chinese American Voters Education Committee and the Los Angeles Times surveys from "various years" [authors' note])

In Table 4.3, Lien (2001) and the PNAAP survey showed that a greater proportion of Filipino Americans identified themselves as Democrats, compared to the Los Angeles Times survey. The survey also showed that among Vietnamese Americans, party identification levels were low among both parties; most respondents had no affiliation or declined to state.

Table 4.3 Party Affiliation of Vietnamese and Filipino Americans

	Vietnamese	Filipino
N=	137	266

Party Affiliation		
Democrat	12	40
Republican	15	20
Independent	15	14
N/A, None	59	26

Source: Lien, Pei-Te, Christian Collet, Janelle Wong, and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, (data is from the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey, 2000-2001)

Disparities in Socio-Economic Status between Vietnamese Americans and Filipino Americans

There are large disparities in education levels between Vietnamese Americans and Filipino Americans. According to the Los Angeles Times surveys (see Table 4.1), the proportion of Filipino American college graduates is significantly higher than Vietnamese Americans. By contrast, a majority of Vietnamese American respondents had high school educations or less, compared to one-eighth of Filipino American respondents.

Similarly, the surveys also show that income level disparities exist between the two groups. The results show that a majority of the Vietnamese American respondents reported earning less than $20,000 per year, five times the rate of Filipino Americans. At the other extreme, the percentage of respondents who reported earning more than $50,000 a year was three times higher among Filipino Americans than Vietnamese Americans. Moreover, the percentage of unemployed

respondents was over three times higher among Vietnamese Americans than Filipino Americans (Ong and Lee 2001).

The disparities in Socio-Economic Status are a reflection of immigration policies and trends, spanning the last four decades. Specifically, education and English fluency were key factors in facilitating the post-1965 wave of Filipino immigration to the United States, putting a premium on educated, English-fluent migrants. By contrast, most of the refugees from Vietnam lacked the same education and English-fluency levels (the only exception being the first immigration wave of 120,000 refugees, who left shortly after the Fall of Saigon in 1975). Table 4.1 shows that the level of English fluency is higher among Filipino Americans than Vietnamese Americans (Ong and Lee 2004).

English fluency has major implications in the United States when it comes to the ethnic groups' abilities to acquire political knowledge, formulate political opinions, and crystallize their ideologies. Since most of the political information and debate on American politics is presented in an English-speaking media, non-English fluent Americans must confront more obstacles in order to gather and evaluate this information. Table 4.1 shows that Filipino American respondents use the English-speaking media in greater rates than Vietnamese American respondents. The inaccessibility for many Vietnamese Americans of the English-speaking media reduces the likelihood that they will inform themselves and formulate opinions on American political or social issues. Without a foundation of political knowledge, many first and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans will be unable to transmit their

(nonexistent or limited) American political ideologies to their offspring. Consequently, most of the younger 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans will need to utilize sources other than their parents in order to develop their political ideologies.

<u>Gender Gap</u>

The United States immigration policies and the Philippines emigration policies since the 1970s enabled many Filipinos to come to the United States as skilled workers, namely as nurses and other health professionals. Filipina laborers have emigrated permanently and temporarily in large numbers to more affluent nations around the world. Female emigration from the Philippines is a consequence of the "brain drain" phenomenon, which began in the Marcos administration as a way of dealing with a large Filipino and Filipina population that was highly educated and English-fluent, but underemployed or unemployed. As far as Filipinas were concerned, they would work overseas to help financially support their families, while leaving their families behind. Given the relative power of Filipinas in the productive (labor) and reproductive (familial) spheres, this practice with Filipina workers was not only socially accepted, but encouraged by, and formalized under, the Marcos administration (Joyce and Hunt 1982, Carino 1987, Espiritu 1995). The strongly patriarchical Vietnamese family structure and limited access to education, made similar opportunities for Vietnamese women very unlikely (Kibria 1990).

In essence, the relative power and autonomy that Filipina women have made it

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easier for them to come to the United States to cash in on their education and language skills at a time when the United States was in need of skilled laborers, particularly in the health profession. Filipina immigration to the United States, composed largely of skilled laborers, was a first step in facilitating the post-1965 chain migration. Chain migration is the process by which Asian immigrants would gain legal residence or citizenship in the United States, and then use their legal immigration status to petition family members in Asia to subsequently immigrate to the United States. American military enlistment and skilled worker preferences began the chain migration for Filipino Americans, while Vietnamese refugees began the chain migration for Vietnamese Americans.

Eventually, many of these women would go through the process of gaining citizenship, and as Americans citizens, would send for their families using family reunification preferences in the U.S. immigration laws to expedite their arrival and resettlement to the United States. Table 4.1 shows that the percentage of females living in the United States is higher among Filipina Americans (55%) than Vietnamese Americans (48%), thus confirming historically high levels of Filipina immigration to the United States (Ong and Lee 2001).

Interpreting the Data

These results show that Vietnamese Americans are less likely than Filipino Americans to participate in the American political process, as citizens and as voters. Citizenship implies that individuals have some formal identification with the nation

and its political institutions, especially those who are naturalized citizens. Voter registration suggests that these individuals have some level of awareness on relevant political issues. Thus, higher rates of citizenship and voter registration suggest a greater likelihood that these individuals know, and have a greater interest in knowing, the political issues of where they live. One can also assume that American political values and beliefs will be most defined and crystallized among registered voters in the United States, less defined by American citizens who are not-registered voters, and least defined by non-citizens. Given the results, Filipino Americans are in a better position to transmit their political ideas, values, and beliefs to their children because of their higher levels of voter registration and citizenship. By contrast, because a higher proportion of Vietnamese Americans are not registered voters or citizens, American political values and beliefs are relatively less defined for more of them. Consequently, a smaller proportion of Vietnamese Americans will possess the ability to transmit their political views on American issues to their offspring.

One explanation that scholars have used to explain the discrepancy in party affiliation is the strong anti-communist sentiment among the relatively large refugee Vietnamese American population (Ong and Lee 2001), combined with the anti-Marcos sentiment among the relatively large college educated Filipino American population (Lien 2001).

Because the end of the Cold War and the Marcos regime are becoming distant memories, particularly among Filipino and Vietnamese second generations, other factors must be considered, such as class and education. More affluent registered

voters tend to be Republicans, while higher educated registered voters tend to be Democrats. However, class and education are variables that are themselves consequences of immigration patterns and policy. Given the refugee status and the underdeveloped education system in Vietnam, a very large proportion of Vietnamese immigrants to the United States did not have high levels of education (see below). Thus, education does not significantly factor into party affiliation for first (and some 1.5) generation Vietnamese Americans. Nevertheless, Vietnamese Americans are more likely to be naturalized citizens and more likely to be registered voters if they are more affluent today. And if they are registered to vote, they would more likely align themselves with the Republicans, consistent with other affluent American voters. Unlike less affluent American registered voters, who tend to be Democrats, less affluent Vietnamese Americans tend not to be naturalized citizens at all, let alone be registered voters. This explains the both relatively low voter registration rates and the skew of Vietnamese American voter demographics towards the Republican Party.

Among Filipino Americans, education plays a more prominent role in explaining higher levels of citizenship and voter registration. Education also might explain why the relatively higher support for Democrats, compared to Vietnamese Americans. Studies show that higher education correlates with a tendency to support Democrats. The fact that Filipino Americans might have received their education in the Philippines does not diminish this point. First of all, instruction in secondary and collegiate institutions is done in English. Second, many of the political and social institutions that exist in the United States have comparable institutions in the

Philippines (political parties, bicameral legislatures, free press, open elections, supreme courts, Christian-based religious institutions), so that Filipino immigrants already have a certain familiarity with the American political system and its institutions. Furthermore, the gender gap phenomenon comes into play: where women tend to support Democrats, and men tend to support Republicans. Because of the higher proportion of Filipina Americans (women), this may explain why more Filipino Americans tend to support Democrats, compared to Vietnamese Americans.

But regardless of their political orientation or party affiliation, the conditions in the United States and the socio-economic backgrounds for most Filipino Americans make it easier for them to develop American political ideologies and to effectively transmit them to their offspring. Moreover, low income (as a proportion of the Filipino American population) does not impact citizenship and voter registration rates in the way that it does for Vietnamese Americans. Furthermore, the relative economic, social, and familial power of Filipina Americans might factor in the ability to formulate, transmit, and replicate (from their mothers) political values, beliefs, and ideologies.

Survey Data Limitations

There are two major limitations with the existing survey data regarding Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans. First of all, there are very few second generation respondents, particularly in the Los Angeles Times surveys, which makes it difficult to draw certain conclusions about the second generation. In

particular, it is difficult to identify specific differences that distinguish the second generation from the first or 1.5 generation. Second, the survey data are limited in providing insight into the process by which these ethnic and generational groups acquire political information, formulate political opinions, and (possibly) transmit their American political values and beliefs to their offspring.

Indeed, variables such as education, income, and gender influence one's party affiliation and political ideology. Numerous political studies have identified these quantitative-based relationships. However, these relationships do not take into account the heterogeneity of the Asian American population, nor do the quantitative relationships consider the direct and indirect consequences of immigration and resettlement in the United States such as ethnic enclaves, co-ethnic employment networks, the changing dynamic of race relations, and dealing with culture "shocks".

My research investigates what factors contribute to political socialization, and also explains how and why these factors facilitate the socialization process. Moreover, I pay special attention to factors related to one's nativity status--whether growing up in Vietnam, the Philippines, or the United States itself--has consequences that influence the importance of certain socializing factors over others. While quantitative studies like the Los Angeles Times surveys, The Pilot Study of the National Asian American Survey, or the U.S. Census data offer some indications, this project will use data from interview responses to uncover what the more powerful factors of political socialization are for these ethnic groups.

CHAPTER FIVE: UNDERSTANDING THE GENERATIONAL EFFECTS AND THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESSES THROUGH INTERVIEW DATA OF FILIPINO AMERICANS

This chapter focuses on general trends discovered during the course of my interviews with Filipino American respondents. I highlight the disparities between first, 1.5, and second generations among relevant variables. This section will focus on the following potential factors of socialization: 1) the transmission of cultural norms from parent to child, 2) the influence of Catholicism, 3) the function of ethnic enclaves, 4) how migration shapes one's economic views, 5) the impact of education. While not all of these factors directly involve politics, they do offer some insight into the ability of parents to socialize their children. Understanding how effective parents are in socializing their children in non-political matters can reveal how effective they might be in transmitting political information and ideologies to their children.

1. The transmission of cultural norms from parent to child

Intergenerational transmission of cultural norms appears to be most extensive and successful among first generation Filipino Americans (with their Filipino parents). By contrast, this transmission process was least extensive and successful among the second generation, with the 1.5 generation found somewhere in between. This is not to suggest that the second generation has completely disavowed the norms

and values of previous generations. Rather, certain values, such as education, hard work, respect for elders, and the importance of family (which includes extended family) remain significant among the 1.5 and second generations. Table 5.1 shows that most 1.5 and second generation Filipino American respondents identified themselves as "bicultural Filipino and American." Among the first generation, more respondents identified themselves as "strongly Filipino" than "bicultural Filipino and American."

Table 5.1 Adherence and Identification to Filipino and American Values

		Generation Group	
	Second	1.5	First
Strongly Filipino	0 (0.0%)	7 (21.2%)	26 (46.4%)
Bicultural Filipino and American	15 (83.3%)	25 (75.8%)	20 (35.7%)
Strongly American	3 (16.7%)	1 (3.0%)	10 (17.9%)

Debbie R., 35, and a second generation Filipina American, stated that although she "lives as an American, it is important to learn Filipino values, and live a bicultural life...(by) negotiating which values (she) will use based on the situation." She goes on to say that Filipinos value "being interdependent," while Americans value "being independent." Debbie concludes that Filipino Americans, herself included, learn to be "adaptable" as they grow up.

Justin C., 23, and a second generation Filipino American, adds that values

such as "being hardworking (and) the importance of family, religion, and academics" are instilled "pretty aggressively" by his parents. He suggests that the second generation "know the values," but it is up to them to decide which to follow.

Debbie and Justin's responses illustrate the willingness by the second generation to absorb the values and beliefs transmitted by their first generation parents. As they grew up, part of the socialization process for them (and to the 1.5 generation, for that matter) is to determine which of those values and beliefs have a practical benefit in American society, and then apply them where appropriate. So while the values and beliefs espoused by the 1.5 and second generation may ultimately differ from the first generation, the disparity between the generations is due more to the conscious decisions made by the 1.5 and second generation, rather than the inability of the first generation to transmit their values and beliefs on to their children.

Furthermore, extended family often plays a critical role in instilling and teaching cultural values. For many Filipino Americans, cultural transmission is not a role exclusively performed by the parents. Edwin M., 33, and a 1.5 generation Filipino American explains that "parents (not only) spoke (to him) to teach Filipino values, (but also) used similarly-aged relatives (as their parents) to teach (and reinforce) those values."

As a child, Stacey-Claire C., 22, and a 1.5 generation Filipina American was separated from both her mother, who was working as a nurse in Saudi Arabia (see Joyce and Hunt 1982, which addresses oversea Filipina nurses), and her father who

was in the U.S. Navy. As a young child in the Philippines, Stacey-Claire was raised by aunts and uncles who instilled Filipino values. Once she reunited with her parents in the United States (at age 9), her parents tended to emphasize "western" values. Her experience was one of being exposed to two different families cultivating her two different perceptions.

Another respondent, Julina C., 32, and a 1.5 generation Filipina American who was separated from her parents as a young age due to economic hardship, acknowledged that as she was growing up, her own "self-confidence (was built) through relatives (and served as the) the primary motivation to finish school...(and that) different relatives played a role in raising (her) at different times (during) childhood." Thus, the extended family not only serves to complement parental attempts to transmit cultural values to their children, but they sometimes act as the parents' surrogates in this process. While there are disparities in terms of which cultural practices each generation will adopt from their parents, the persistence and consistency of the respondents' parents (or older relatives who fulfill parental roles) in trying to instill those ideas upon the respondents appears relatively strong across all generations. Filipino family structures remained mostly intact because of the existence of extended family members living in the United States (Espiritu 1995). Broadly speaking, despite the potentially unstable process of immigration and resettlement, Filipino American children are not necessarily deprived of learning about their Filipino culture, because uncles, aunts, grandparents, "kababayan" (family friends from the same region or town in the Philippines) and older cousins are often

present to teach them these lessons. The cultural influence of "extended family" not only includes blood or "by-marriage" relatives, but also non-related individuals from specific areas in the Philippines, who shared similar cultural values with the respondents or their parents. Thus, even without the physical presence of military fathers (see Chan 1991 and Posadas 1999) or overseas nurse mothers, sources for cultural transmission were available to the children.

To be clear, there are specific cultural practices that are not well transmitted from first generation Filipino parents to their second generation offspring. Examples include language, the practice of corporal punishment, celebrating or participating in traditional events specific to local areas of the Philippines, and gender norms in the household structure. But the reasons why the 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans deviate from their first generation parents appear different than the reasons for their Vietnamese American counterparts. For the Filipino Americans, deviation from the first generation was a conscious decision. For the Vietnamese Americans, deviation from the first generation was result of a cultural vacuum, which took form upon the Vietnamese resettling in the United States.

Saturnino N., 83, and a first generation Filipino American believes that Filipino (in the Philippines were) much more aggressive in trying to instill values than Filipinos in the United States. After immigrating to the United States in 1946, he agreed that the "younger generations are and should be more (individualistic), so long as they maintain the respect of elders." He believes that the younger Filipinos should learn their language (or Filipino dialect of their ancestors) and that they should

learn about various aspects of Filipino culture and history, but only if they (the younger generation) want to.

In Stacey-Claire's case discussed above, she took it upon herself to learn more about Filipino culture throughout her high school and college years and through study and interaction with other Filipino relatives she met in the United States. For her, resources were available in her voluntary attempt to discover her Filipino heritage. Aided in that effort was the relatively close presence of the elder Filipino American community in Salinas, whom Stacey Claire regularly interacted with during her studies at California State University, Monterey Bay.

However, the notion that 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans should pick and choose which aspects of Filipino culture should be employed or concealed is not without some critics. Joseph B., 24, and a second generation Filipino American, retorts that the Filipino values that the second generation adopts tend to be "superficial...(such as) food, parties, and family values (which are more generic than uniquely Filipino)." He goes on to say that the second generation knows very little about the politics and history of the Filipino and Filipino American community. This is because the parents (who are overwhelmingly first generation) encourage their children to "be typical red-blooded Americans...(who are financially) well off and prestigious." Thus, despite the notion that 1.5 and second generation Filipino American respondents have a choice of which set of values they want to live by, Filipino or American, their decisions are not perceived as uniformly positive.

Renato P., 52, and a first generation Filipino American observes that parents

are "very non-committal in articulating values (to their children)." He feels that Filipino children in the United States learn their cultural values more from following the examples of their parents (good or bad) rather than what their parents say. Emulation in the Filipino American community is possible, because the acculturation of the first and 1.5 generation Filipino Americans into American society was not (relatively speaking) hampered by language, educational, or religious barriers.

On political matters, there tends to be a strong level of ideological consistency between Filipino American parents and children. Ideologically, most respondents stated that their political views were very similar to those of their parents, assuming that the respondents believed that their parents had any interest in politics to begin with. Table 5.2 shows that the overwhelming majority of first and 1.5 generation Filipino Americans share similar political views as their parents; the second generation's ideological deviation from their parents is more pronounced. None of the Filipino American second generation respondents indicated that their parents were "not political," unlike their Vietnamese American counterparts. The reliability of these results can be debated (see the Chapter 3 section on the Cautionary Note of Offspring Reports of Parental Attitudes). However, if these findings are plausible, it is worth investigating the factors that led to this outcome.

Table 5.2 Political Ideological Consistency between Respondent and Parent

		Generation Group	
	Second	1.5	First
Respondent and Parent are Similar	10 (55.6%)	20 (60.6%)	35 (62.5%)
Respondent and Parent are Dissimilar (Ideologically)	8 (44.4%)	5 (15.2%)	1 (1.8%)
Respondent and Parents are Dissimilar (Parents not Political)	0 (0%)	8 (24.2%)	20 (35.7%)

There are some reasons that explain why political apathy exists among the first and older 1.5 generation Filipino American parents. Edwin M., a self-described moderate Republican, explains that his parents were often unaware or undecided on most political issues, and that his parents lacked the kind of enthusiasm he had to learn about political and economic issues. Edwin suggests that because he financially supports his parents, he is "sheltering them (from) needing to get involved in politics."

Celedonio R., 71, and a first generation Filipino American argues "the ability to endure hardship (and learning) how to survive (were more important than politics)." Those who had money and had something to protect were the people who could get involved in politics. This was the general sentiment among the Filipinos who immigrated to the United States as non-skilled laborers or as military enlistees.

The general transmission of cultural and political ideology from parents to

children tended to be very effective among the first generation and generally effective among the 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans. The 1.5 and second generations make specific deviations from their parents on specific cultural practices or on positions of certain political issues, as they are perceived by the respondents. The data also suggest that what distinguishes Filipino American parents and children from Vietnamese American parents and children is the level of American political information being transmitted to the younger 1.5 and second generation. Transmission levels are higher for Filipino Americans and lower for Vietnamese Americans. The data from Table 5.2 shows that a significant proportion of Filipino American respondents and their parents had political ideologies that were consistent. More remarkably, however, the level of dissimilar respondent-parent political ideologies due to the parents not being political was zero for the second generation and only 24% among the 1.5 generation. This suggest that first, 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans have more defined political ideologies than their Vietnamese American counterparts.

The 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans interviewees claim to clearly understand the political values and views of their parents and use them as a foundation for their own political values and views. Unlike the first generation Vietnamese Americans, many of whom either do not possess or somehow conceal their political ideologies from their children, a higher proportion of first generation Filipino American respondents have defined ideologies that their children can either embrace or oppose. Moreover, all Filipino American generations will utilize their

own experiences in America as a means of holding on to or reforming that foundation--a selective adaptation approach in forming political (as well as cultural) identities. Understanding this process is important, because this indicates that childhood socialization better explains how Filipino Americans in all three generational groups come to define their political ideologies.

Proponents of childhood socialization believe that political ideologies are shaped during childhood, only to crystallize once they are adults. For the most part, those beliefs will not change during adulthood but crystallize. For all generational groups of Filipino Americans, factors of socialization that have been identified actually serve a dual role. Factors such as parents and extended family are prominent transmitting agents during the respondents' childhood, but they are also reinforcing agents for the respondents during adulthood.

The relatively high level of consistency between the political ideologies of Filipino parents and children across all generations suggests that parents have effectively transmitted cultural and political values to their children. One explanation for this is that all Filipino Americans generations have been exposed to similar institutions that shape both political and cultural beliefs, such as schools, churches, even the media, not to mention the role of family. The continuous presence of these institutions from childhood through adulthood serve to affirm previously learned values and beliefs. Moreover, the process of transmitting cultural values and beliefs to their own children or younger relatives becomes one of reaffirmation--of crystallization--for the transmitters. This is in contrast with the 1.5 and second

generation Vietnamese Americans, who defined their political ideologies later in their lives because their exposure to political debate and information about issues facing the United States began later.

2. The role of the Catholic faith

Most of the Filipino American respondents identify as Roman Catholics. The level of respondent identification as Roman Catholic tends to be consistent across all generations. The data are summarized in table 5.3. Almost all of the Filipino American Catholics were born and raised in the Church. Most respondents indicated that they began to identify as Catholics in early childhood (89%) . Almost all participated in religious education (CCD) leading to their receipt of first communion and confirmation sacraments. As they reached their adult years, a majority of the respondents admitted that their identification with Catholicism was weak, but they went to mass regularly anyway. These are commonly referred to as "social Catholics." Given the religious demographics of Filipino Americans in this project and the historical connection between Catholicism and Spanish colonial rule over the Philippines, spanning over 300 years (Chan 1991), it is plausible to conclude that Catholicism has differentiated Filipino Americans from other Asian American groups. As it relates to this study, the existence of a large Catholic community in the United States sheltered Filipino immigrants to be sheltered from one form of culture shock experienced by most Vietnamese immigrants: free religious practice. This section will examine data from Filipino American respondents who identified as

Catholics.

Table 5.3 Demographics of Roman Catholic Respondents

		Generation Group	
Respondent Level of Identification as Catholic	Second	1.5	First
Weak/Not Very Strong	4 (28.6%)	10 (31.3%)	13 (28.3%)
Fairly/Moderately Strong	6 (42.(%)	10 (31.3%)	16 (34.8%)
Strong/Very Strong	4 (28.6%)	12 (37.5%)	17 (37.0%)
Attend Mass Regularly (2-4 times/month)	12 (85.7%)	28 (87.5%)	44 (95.7%)
Participate in Church or Religious Activity or Organization	5 (35.7%)	11 (34.4%)	19 (41.3%)

Percentages are among those respondents who identify as Catholic.

The data from table 5.3 indicate a varied range of responses regarding the self-assessed level of identification with Catholicism. While most stated that they attended Mass regularly (2-4 times per month), only some respondents were active in their parish communities beyond attending Mass. The generational groups showed similar levels of identification with the Church.

However, respondents who were active in their church communities tended to

participate in activities with those who were in their general age range. For example, Victoria U., 59, and a first generation Filipina American, is the coordinator of the Legion of Mary in her parish, where she "facilitated prayer workshops, group pilgrimages to Israel, annual international fairs at the parish grounds, and helped preside over meetings to improve the (infrastructure) of the local parish." This group is composed primarily of middle-aged to older women, and provides each member with social and spiritual support as well as opportunities for leadership and service. In general, fund-raising, prayer groups, and traditional rituals (even those originating in the Philippines and later transplanted here) were popular activities for older Filipino American parishioners.

By contrast, younger Filipino Americans (overwhelmingly 1.5 and second generation) tended to choose youth groups, church retreats, and social justice ministry as their form of church participation. One respondent, Camillo B., 35, and a second generation Filipino American, served as volunteer for the youth ministry at his local parish, because it provided him "an opportunity to be a mentor and role model for the (children). As a college student (at the time), I was old enough to provide teens and adolescents with insight into the near future, (while) being young enough to relate to the problems (facing young people) today. Another example, Kimverly N., 29, and a second generation Filipina American, coordinates the "Jail ministry" in her parish where members go to the local juvenile detention facility, and give communion to the residents. They (and others in that age group) observe that the members in their respective ministries are also in their general age group.

Although age is a factor in determining which ministries or church activities the respondents elect to participate in, the second generations Filipino Americans are generally much younger than the first generation. Issues of concern and opportunities for leadership and service are going to be different for younger people than they are for older people. Thus, while faith is strong among members across generations, how that faith is manifested, spread, and expressed differs between generations, due in large part to the inherent age differences between the first and second generations. And because the respondents "select" the ministries and activities associated with the church, one can conclude their participation functions more as a mechanism for crystallizing the respondents' own faith, rather than the respondents being socialized by the Church.

In addition to differences in the types of parish activities based on age, but there were also some differences in what interviewees believed were the most important teachings of the Catholic Church. Older Filipino Americans tended to identify more with prayers and symbols unique to the Catholic Church and to the Catholic community in the Philippines. Examples include the prayer of the rosary, celebration of saints, and rituals or religious events connected with specific areas of the Philippines, where the older (first generation) Filipinos lived, prior to coming to the United States.

For example, Marina G., 74, and a first generation Filipina American, would lead prayer rituals at different homes to commemorate the 8th and 40th day death anniversaries of family or relatives. These events include a group recitation of the

rosary and other prayers, spoken in Tagalog or Ilocano. Many of these prayers originated in regional parishes in the Philippines. Moreover, Marina leads prayer groups on specific days to commemorate local Philippine patron saints, like Our Lady of Fatima or Santo Nino, where litanies of Ilocano or Tagalog prayers are recited. These gatherings not only reaffirm the spirituality among the community's participants, the use of Ilocano or Tagalog in the rituals also reaffirms their Filipino heritage. These rituals are a conflation of religious and ethnic identity. Most of the 1.5 and second generations have attended these gatherings, but tend to be observers rather than active participants in the prayer rituals.

The 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans respondents emphasize the "golden rule" as the most important aspect of the Catholic faith that they identify with. Moreover, many self-identified strong Catholics (from these groups) qualified their positions, by stating that there are some political and social issues in which they are in disagreement with the Catholic church. For example:

Joseph B. identifies with Catholicism, "sprinkled with liberal beliefs..."

Debbie R. says that she "does not push religion to the extent that her parents (and older relatives) do."

Michelle P., 28, and also a second generation Filipina American, says that "I don't agree with all the teachings or beliefs of the Church...(That said), because Jesus sacrificed for us, we must be willing to sacrifice for others (and we must) be respectful to other people just as (we) want to be respected."

Edwin M. identifies more with the homilies (Catholic "sermons") and

readings from the Bible, than he does the "old prayers and all the (rituals) about the saints (performed in) the Philippines."

Furthermore, many of the 1.5 and second generation openly admit that there were times in their lives where they struggled with their Catholic identification. Thus, while older Filipino American Catholics (exclusively first generation) tend to strictly adhere to Filipino and Catholic traditions, younger Filipino American Catholics (mostly 1.5 and second generation) tend to identify more with specific teachings and values that reach all Christian faiths, and they tend to be more flexible and selective in their adoption of Filipino and Catholic traditions. Stacey Claire C. echoes a common trend among college-aged Filipino Americans in that she "became more open to other Christian denominations (since she began her studies at Cal State Monterey Bay 2 years ago)." Her willingness to investigate other Christian denominations was due to her exposure to the college environment.

While the surge of Filipino immigration to the United States began in the 1970s during the authoritarian Marcos regime, there were major institutions in the Philippines that allowed political debate, including the Catholic Church. Not only did this institution endure under Marcos, but it was instrumental in mobilizing popular support to force Marcos from office (Chan 1991, Espiritu 1995).

On the other hand, the influence of Catholicism on American political ideology, according to the data, appears to be limited, save for issues like abortion, the death penalty, gay rights, and divorce. On economic and military issues, the interviews suggest that the influence of the Church is non-existent. However, the

data also suggest that religion for Filipino Americans is much more influential in shaping political beliefs than it is for Vietnamese Americans. Historically, the Catholic Church was a vocal antagonist of the Marcos regime and it remains a major political presence in Philippine politics today. Even in the United States, there is a strong relationship between Catholicism and Filipino American political ideology.

While Catholicism introduces to most Filipino children many core values, the Filipino American Catholic respondents acknowledged that their religious identification had only a limited role in shaping their political beliefs. For Filipino Americans, the process of political socialization is better explained by pre-Adult Socialization theories. Across all generations, many respondents freely disagree with the Church's position on a wide range of social and political issues. The data suggest that Filipino American Catholics "need" the Church, but for different reasons. Hence, different generations of active Filipino American Catholics diverge in the ministries or activities they choose to participate in. The Church's role, according to respondents, is more to affirm pre-existing values and beliefs, rather than to convince or socialize the respondents as adults to unilaterally adopt the Church's position on issues. Consequently, Catholicism appears more to be a crystallizing agent for political values and beliefs of adult Filipino American Catholics than a socializing one.

3. The role of ethnic enclaves

As I mentioned earlier, ethnic enclaves are defined here as neighborhoods or

communities where a larger proportion of the residences or businesses are owned or

occupied by specific ethnic or racial groups. These areas enable people of similar

cultural and ethnic backgrounds to interact and communicate with each other. Most

Filipino Americans do not live in, but often visit ethnic enclaves. Table 5.4 shows the

concentration of Filipino Americans who lived or regularly visited ethnic enclaves.

The proportion of respondents who lived in or regularly visited ethnic enclaves is

relatively high across all generations.

Table 5.4 Frequency of living or regularly visiting in ethnic enclaves

		Generation Group	
Respondent	Second	1.5	First
Lived or Visited Ethnic Enclave	10 (55.6%)	23 (69.7%)	28 (50.0%)
Visited Ethnic Enclave	5 (27.8%)	10 (30.3%)	26 (46.4%)
Neither Lived nor Visited Ethnic Enclave	3 (16.7%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (3.6%)

*"visited" literally means that the respondent regularly visited a Filipino ethnic
enclave

The effect of ethnic enclaves on Filipino Americans varies. The interview

responses indicate that ethnic enclaves have had a more profound impact on first

generation Filipino Americans than the 1.5 or second generation. This is because the

enclaves serve to ease the transition of resettlement in the United States by providing

individuals with an area that is familiar and comfortable. The enclaves ameliorate

potential culture shock, by providing immigrants the amenities and remnants of their birth nation. Specifically, first generation Filipino Americans can eat the food, speak the language, participate in social events, and worship in churches that are reminiscent of the Philippines. However, despite the importance of the enclaves to the first generation Filipino Americans, these areas serve more to reinforce known Filipino cultural values for the first generation rather than to teach cultural values to the 1.5 and second generations. Enclaves have little if any relevance in socializing the younger 1.5 and second generations. There are no Filipino language schools, no Lunar New Year type of celebrations, and virtually no enclave-based organizations or events to encourage younger 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans to connect or re-connect with the Philippines.

Nastacio V., 72, and a first generation Filipino American, believes the enclaves provide "the opportunity to associate with (other people who have) things in common such as language, food, and common experiences of life in the Philippines." For him, the convenience of living close to other Filipino American neighbors makes it easier for people like Nastacio to reminisce about the old days back in the Philippines, to poignantly reflect back on the common economic hardships that plagued many Filipinos before arriving in the United States, and to discuss current events in the United States that impact their lives, a discussion with others who share a common perspective and similar experiences.

Estelita P., 55, and a first generation Filipina American, adds that enclaves enabled her "to get to know more (Filipino) people (and that this) made it more

comfortable to be out in the (greater) community at large." As an immigrant, by first making friends and finding comfort in Filipino enclaves, Estelita became more motivated and confident to venture out in other communities. In her case, the enclaves aided her acculturation process in America.

Felipa P., 57, and a first generation Filipina American, the enclaves are "like being home (in the Philippines) meeting friends and relatives, where 'family' is always around (and) there is someone there who can listen to (and empathize with) your problems." Ethnic enclaves are an illustration of why Asian American immigrants tend to congregate in the same areas, once they arrive in the United States despite governmental attempts to disperse them throughout the country (see Chan 1991 regarding the American government's resettling of Cambodian Americans, via "cluster communities"). Co-ethnic immigrants follow each other. It is not by accident that so many Asian immigrants have settled in California. There was a large Filipino American community in California (mostly farm workers and U.S. Naval personnel) well before the post-1965 immigration rush. Small as they were in the 1960s, these Filipino American communities became hubs for subsequent Filipino immigrants.

For the 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans, ethnic enclaves might serve to remind them of their roots, but the data suggest that this potential impact is limited. Indeed, some of the 1.5 and second generation perceive ethnic enclaves as places where they can maintain an "awareness" of Filipino culture and tradition, but not actively participate or immerse themselves in them. Awareness is beneficial to

them insofar as it enables them to choose which aspects of Filipino culture and which aspects of American culture they want to integrate into their lives. Enclaves can serve a source of inspiration for some of the second generation respondents.

While attending U.C. Santa Barbara, Joseph B., began spending considerable time during breaks in his schedule doing research "on (his) own" inside Filipino enclaves, especially Historic Filipinotown (located in the eastern part of downtown Los Angeles). There, he observed and participated in community events and had numerous conversations with residents and as well as members Filipino American community press. Filipino American-themed newspapers like Mabuhay, Asian Journal, and Herald Examiner are distributed all over California, and have offices in Historic Filipinotown. "Exposure to (these enclaves) reinforced my own political beliefs...by actually seeing cultural and economic practices of these (enclaves)--the good and the bad--helped me understand what I can do to improve the (plight) of all Filipino Americans." His research was fueled by a personal desire to connect with his Filipino identity. What started as a "research project" to learn about the Filipino American community and its history led Joseph B. to his current position as Community Liaison for the Historic Filipinotown district in Los Angeles.

Joseph's openness to embrace the existence of Filipino enclaves, however, is not shared by all 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans. For others Filipino Americans of the younger generations, the perception of ethnic enclaves is quite negative. In fact, some of those who live in these enclaves also harbor negative feelings. They see ethnic enclaves as an extension of first generation family members

who try to constrain the ability of the younger Filipino American generation to define themselves, to be like other Americans. Amber R., a second generation Filipina American who lives in Mira Mesa (a community in San Diego with a large Filipino American and Vietnamese American population), is wary of the area because she believes "the neighborhoods are too conservative and traditionally Asian...Filipinos are supposed to be conservative and respectful (at least this is the "message" the first generation is constantly telling the second generation) but many (of the second generation) are not--they (the second generation) are more outspoken, blunt and disrespectful. (Because so many first generation) family members live (in Mira Mesa, the second generation) can't escape that (message)."

Michelle P., a second generation Filipina American, says that while the enclaves of National City and Mira Mesa "are a reminder that I am a Filipina, at times I will try to stay away from (those enclaves)," because those areas are "FOB-bish." The term "FOB" is a derogatory acronym (Fresh Off the Boat), which refers to new American immigrants, namely from East and Southeast Asia. The implication is that new Asian immigrants who are not yet sufficiently "Americanized," are perceived to be inferior than Asians who are "Americanized."

While the perception of FOBs is present across all Asian American ethnic groups, the stigma is arguably greater in the Filipino American community. Consider that the education system in the Philippines is based on the American model; English has been the primary language of elementary, secondary, and college level instruction since American colonial rule in 1898. Fluency is English is a marker of education

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and social status in the Philippines (Espiritu 1995); resettling in the United States does not change that perception. Primrose S., a 1.5 generation Filipina American, argues that "America is so much better than the Philippines...I don't understand why (first generation Filipino Americans) can't just let go."

The emphasis of teaching the Filipino language to the younger 1.5 and second generation is far less pronounced than it is for other Asian American ethnic groups. To many of the younger 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans, learning Tagalog or Ilocano beyond a basic, barely conversational level is not worth the effort, since they live in the United States. Unfortunately for new Filipino immigrants, who presumably have thicker accents and less command of the English language than the second generation Filipino Americans, they will continue to be perceived as FOBs, as inferior by some of the 1.5 and second generation. This in part explains why ethnic enclaves which seem "too Asian," as Michelle P. pointed out, are a turn-off for some 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans.

According to the first generation Filipino Americans, the ethnic enclaves are in large part able to accommodate the diversity of the Filipino American community. The first and 1.5 generation respondents all came from either Tagalog, Ilocano, or Pangasinan speaking regions of the Philippines. While ethnic enclaves serve an important function for most first and older 1.5 generation Filipino Americans, Filipino cultural values are more heterogeneous, given that many of these values are more region-specific than uniformly Filipino. Moreover, various cross-cutting cleavages inside the Filipino American community exist, which further reveals how

diverse the community is.

For example, Filipino Americans in the military or the financial sector tend to have conservative views. Yet others who are in the technology and health professional fields tend to have liberal views. Filipina Americans are prominent in the health professional field, and are becoming increasingly visible in elementary and secondary education (also liberal leaning). Geographically speaking, while all Filipino immigrants tended to resettle in Hawaii or California, emigrants from metro Manila tended to be more liberal and anti-Marcos and emigrants from rural provinces in Luzon tended to be more conservative and pro-Marcos.

Understanding the diversity of the Filipino American community is necessary to understand why the organizational structure of the community is horizontal and fragmented. This is in contrast with the vertical structure of the Chinese American community and the influence wielded by the Gongsuo and district association leadership (Nee and Nee 1973). There are multitudes of Filipino American organizations, many of which are based in ethnic enclaves. But, no single organization or institution is arguably more prominent than the others. There are no specific leaders who speak on behalf of the broader Filipino American community or who single-handedly wield political or economic influence over the community. Rather, the organizational structure is composed of numerous small, co-existing units that either cooperate or compete with each other. Examples of non-religious based organizations include:

Cabugao Organization of Southern California

(Cabugao is district in Ilocos Sur province)

Filipino American Western Tarlac Organization

(Tarlac is a Province)

Anak ti Abra

(Abra is a Province)

Malasiki Niyan of San Diego County

(Malasiki is a city in Pangasinan province)

Legionarios Del Trabajo

(a fraternal club composed of Filipino American farmworkers)

Subic Organization

(Subic Bay, in Zambales province, was the location of the former U.S.

Naval base)

Samahan Seniors Association

("Samahan" means companionship in Tagalog)

Pilipino Medical Association

Notice that many of the organizations listed above are geographically based from areas of emigration in the Philippines. Their membership is almost exclusively composed of immigrants. The American offspring do not share their parents' emotional ties to the Philippines, much less their ancestors' home region. The examples above illustrate the diversity of organizations and institutions that Filipino Americans participate in. Bonus (2000) characterizes this organizational structure as

"Palengke Politics," after the Filipino word "palengke," meaning a large, open market where anything from food to electronics are sold, and the prices are negotiated between the customers and vendors. The idea of the palengke suggests that vendors (the organizations) and customers (individuals) are interdependent, and that neither the vendor nor the customer wield much power over the entire system (the Filipino American community). These organizations do provide a forum for political discussions.

Aquino A., 77, and a first generation Filipino American from Mira Mesa, explains that "discussions with other friends in the neighborhood...and from the local senior center (who are overwhelmingly first generation Filipino American)" are a major source of political information. "The old-timers sit around and talk about what the American government is doing right, and what we need to do to protect ourselves."

Edith R., 69, and a first generation Filipina American also from Mira Mesa, adds that the local chapter of the Cabugao Organization of Southern California is where she gets political information, through discussions with the other members in the organization.

Local organizations primarily based in ethnic enclaves can be sources where adult Filipino Americans obtain information on American issues and to engage in political debates. This is more an exercise of crystallization than socialization because the schemas by which new political information is interpreted were already established during childhood, illustrations of cognitive development theories in

action. However, the palengke politics model inside the Filipino American community suggests that these individuals instead choose the organizations they wish to participate in, and therefore are more likely to select organizations whose membership holds views that are consistent with their own. Adults pick and choose the ideas they want and the company they want to keep--just like at a palengke.

Given the multitude of different ethnic-based and non-ethnic based organizations and institutions that Filipino Americans are involved with, it is often difficult to find a unified political voice for the entire community. Though the data from Lien et al (2001) indicate that Filipino Americans tend to vote slightly more often for Democrats than Republicans, suggesting the ethnic group's ideology is somewhat more liberal than the Vietnamese Americans, this conclusion would greatly disregard the significant cleavages that exist in the community.

While ethnic enclaves might serve to strengthen cultural values and shape political ideology, these roles are severely limited when it comes to the Filipino American community. For the younger generations, these areas are often viewed with ambivalence, even disdain. For the older generations, these areas serve a vital function in reinforcing cultural values rather than teaching them, more an agent of crystallization than socialization. Given the diversity of organizations that exist, it is plausible to conclude that Filipino Americans might be more inclined to join organizations that represent their views, rather than to change their views as a result of membership in Filipino American organizations. If this is the case, and Bonus's work seems to support this, then these Filipino American organizations and ethnic

enclaves actually accommodate, rather than socialize, one's beliefs.

4. Migration's Effects on Views Regarding Economic Policy and Opportunity

Since the liberalization of U.S. immigration policies in 1965, the Philippines has been one of the largest senders of emigrants to the United States. Like many first generation Americans who came from developing countries around the world, Filipino Americans were motivated to immigrate by the difficult economic situation of their birth nations. From 1965 to 1986, President Ferdinand Marcos ruled the Philippines, adopting ineffective import substitution policies and flouting serious attempts at land reform. He also encouraged skilled Filipinos to work abroad and remit money to the Philippines in order to bolster GDP. Marcos's economic policies led to an economic malaise as neighboring economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore grew significantly through the 1970s and 1980s (Posadas 1999).

The economic stagnation of the Philippines continues. However, despite economic problems, the Philippines maintains a relatively strong, American-style educational system that has produced a skilled, English-fluent, but underemployed labor force, particularly in technical and health professional fields. At the same time, the United States has experienced labor shortages in those same fields over most of the last four decades. This combination of events explains in large part the consistent flow of Filipino immigrants to the United States.

Most of the first and 1.5 generation believe that economic opportunities in the United States are plentiful, provided that individuals are willing to work hard. They

believe that government corruption at all levels is the primary reason why the

Philippines has lagged behind economically. These respondents cite the economic

struggle of the Philippines as one reason (or the reason) why they opted to migrate to

the United States. The data in table 5.5 show that a majority of immigrant Filipino

Americans believe that the American government has positively influenced the

economic welfare of Filipino Americans. The data indicate that fewer second

generation Filipino Americans positively view the American government's attempts at

helping Filipino Americans. Table 5.6 shows that most of the 1.5 generation

respondents believed that their socio-economic situation is better in the United States

than it was in the Philippines, while none of the respondents stated that their situation

was better in the Philippines. Similarly, most of the first generation respondents

stated that their economic situation in the United States is better than it was in the

Philippines. The economic situation of these two groups of respondents while living

in the Philippines varied somewhat; some lived middle-class lifestyles (by Philippine

standards), while most lived in or near poverty.

Table 5.5 Responses to the Performance of the U.S. Government to Promote the
Welfare of Filipino Americans

		Generation Group	
	Second	1.5	First
Positive	11 (61.1%)	24 (72.7%)	46 (82.1%)
Negative	7 (38.9%)	4 (12.1%)	2 (3.6%)
Unclear/Don't Know	0 (0.0%)	5 (15.2%)	8 (14.3%)

Table 5.6 Comparing the Socio-Economic Situation of the Philippines and the United States

	Generation Group	
	1.5	First
United States is Better	26 (78.8%)	49 (87.5%)
The Philippines is Better	0 (0.0%)	2 (3.6%)
About the Same	3 (9.1%)	1 (1.8%)
Don't Know/No Opinion	4 (12.1%)	4 (7.1%)

All of the first generation Filipino Americans interviewed stated that the prospects of improving their socio-economic situation were at least one factor behind their decision to come to the United States. The idea of improving one's financial situation through immigration is not new, nor is it a focus of this project. Rather, the intent here is to explore how Filipino Americans of each generational group perceive American economic policies, whether the American government has done enough to help promote the economic welfare of Filipino Americans, and if these perceptions are consistent or inconsistent across generations.

Even today, the first generation Filipino Americans continue to be quite critical of the economic and political landscape of the Philippines, more than twenty years after the end of the Marcos regime. Amparo W., 62, and a first generation Filipina American, claims that "the Philippine Government is not aggressive in looking at the welfare of the Filipino people, and not aggressive enough in weeding

out the undesirable people in the government...they (the politicians) just keep the money."

The first and older 1.5 generations' view of the Marcos regime appears to be mixed. Note that Filipino immigration to the United States began to soar in the early 1970s, during the onset of Martial Law in the Philippines. While it has been discussed earlier as to why Marcos's economic strategy had failed, Ilocanos tended to be more sympathetic to him and his regime. Conversely, Tagalogs, namely from metro Manila, tended to be more critical. Marcos was from Ilocos Norte, an Ilocano-speaking province, and the popular sentiment was that his administration disproportionately doled out more of the economic spoils to Ilocano provinces, while not properly addressing the needs of Manila's large and bursting population.

Prudencio S., 77, and a first generation Filipino American who came from Ilocos Sur (a neighboring Ilocano region) offers a sympathetic view that "Marcos did many good things for the Philippines...(and he facilitated) many improvements in the country...but it was his wife, Imelda, that lead to his downfall."

Edith R., a first generation Filipina American who emigrated from Manila (a Tagalog region), claims that rumors of Marcos's impending imposition of Martial Law in 1972 was the final straw. Despite grave reservations about leaving the Philippines, she felt that "Marcos blamed the rioters for the problems of the country (and) he lied about how things were (economically) going in the country...we thought it would get better (once he left after his term was completed), but when (he was hinting at imposing) Martial Law, I told (my husband, who was in the U.S. Navy at

the time) we have to go."

The interview responses suggest that while most of the second generation Filipino Americans claim that the American government has generally done well to promote their economic welfare, they believe that Filipino Americans are still limited in the types of jobs they can have, and that there are barriers to top level management positions (the "glass ceiling effect").

Part of the career limitation problem is an internal effect within the Filipino American community. The older generations push the younger generation to enter certain types of employment fields that they or their Filipino American peers participate in: areas such as the health professions (especially nursing), engineering, the military, or accounting. This socializing effect occurs during the childhood of second (and also younger 1.5) generation. In a sense, employment expectations behave like cultural values and beliefs in that these are all aggressively transmitted from parents and similarly-aged relatives to children. As suggested in the "Transmission of Cultural Norms from parents to children" section, it is normal in the Filipino American community to expect children to become nurses or sailors, and family members can often have a profound influence over the young people's career plans.

PJ C., 25, and a second generation Filipino recalls "that all aunties are nurses (or work in the hospital), all my uncles are in the military...they're telling me to take the ASVAB (the armed service entrance exam) and join the (military), so that I could learn discipline." PJ's half-joking statement mocks a common Filipino American

stereotype that, based on his observations of his large extended family in San Diego, seems valid.

This internal socialization occurs because many of the first generation are in areas of the economic sector which are high-status and high paying. While military enlisted personnel may not initially command the same type of status or earnings as other common professional fields, military service is often a stepping stone towards fairly lucrative and very secure civil service positions (i.e. the postal service, civilian staff in military installations, technicians). It is of note that most government agencies give veterans extra consideration when they apply for civil service employment. Given how the first and older 1.5 generation have fared, they want to encourage their offspring to pursue similar careers, careers that created and perpetuated middle and upper-middle class lifestyles.

There is a common perception that careers in health, technical, civil service, and accounting fields are more accessible to Filipino Americans, because they know relatives or Filipino friends in those fields, and they have economically desirable lifestyles. Like their Vietnamese American counterparts, first and 1.5 generation Filipino Americans also facilitate co-ethnic employment networks. Edwin M., a 1.5 generation Filipino American, immigrated to the United States in 1991. Soon after, he befriended some residents from Mira Mesa, who encouraged Edwin to look into jobs in the health profession. "With all the Filipinos working in hospitals (around San Diego), it was easy for me to apply (to work there)." The adage, "it's not what you know, but who you know" is applicable here because of the prominence of Filipino

American workers in local hospitals throughout California. This is an example of the Filipino American employment network in action.

Many Filipino Americans are or were members of the military. Table 5.7 shows that some of the first and 1.5 generation Filipino Americans believed that their military service influenced many of the values and political views they currently hold. Specifically, the interview responses suggest that these political views were based on conversations with colleagues and superiors in the military. These views also indirectly affected 1.5 and second generation children who grew up in a "military family."

Table 5.7 Respondents state influences on political ideology

		Generation Group	
	Second	1.5	First
Media	18 (100%)	32 (97.0%)	52 (92.9%)
Television	16 (88.9%)	32 (97.0%)	52 (92.9%)
Radio	1 (5.6%)	8 (24.2%)	18 (32.1%)
Internet	2 (11.1%)	1 (3.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Print	11 (61.1%)	24 (72.7%)	23 (41.1%)

Occupation	5 (27.8%)	15 (45.5%)	29 (51.8%)
Military	0 (0.0%)	6 (18.2%)	15 (26.8%)
Health Profession	2 (11.1%)	3 (9.1%)	10 (17.9%)
Education	15 (83.3%)	20 (60.6%)	13 (23.2%)

Feliciano S., who is a retired U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer, says that he "enjoyed and learned a great deal from (political) debates and conversations with

other shipmates." He developed deep friendships with many of his military colleagues. And because of that, Feliciano had a certain "respect for their (political) opinions," because they shared a common experience, serving in the military.

Arnel-Samson R., 43, and a 1.5 generation Filipino American currently serving in the U.S. Navy, believes that the "military has been a significant (institutional) influence on my political views...(I) often discussed politics with my (navy) friends and officers...(our) views are pretty similar (on most issues)."

Wilfredo C., 48, and a 1.5 generation Filipino American in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, also acknowledges that the "military mentality" does influence his political views regarding social order, defense, and foreign policy.

Of all the different factors of political socialization (or crystallization), the military factor is the main "exception to the rule" that Filipino Americans of all generations are better illustrations of childhood political socialization than adult political socialization (see Jennings and Markus 1977). The military values and beliefs are impressed upon its members when the individuals are adults. The interview data among Filipino servicemen and veterans is that the "military mentality" that Wilfredo C., identifies, is so uniform and pervasive that adult socialization occurs with these specific individuals.

The second generation's attitudes about Filipino American economic achievement deviate somewhat from the attitudes of the first and 1.5 generation. Although the educational levels of the second generation are comparable to the other generations, there is some concern expressed by many second generation respondents

about external employment barriers facing Filipino Americans. They believe that while Filipino Americans are dominant in some sectors of the economy, they are under-represented in others, namely in management. The question posited here is not whether a "glass ceiling" exists for Filipino Americans, but whether the "glass ceiling effect" is even an issue of concern for Filipino Americans. The interviews suggest that employment barriers are a greater concern for second generation Filipino Americans than for the other groups. This is because many of the second generation want to pursue careers outside the ones that their parents and elder relatives did. By contrast, the "glass ceiling effect" is less of a concern for the first and 1.5 generation, because they tend to possess skills that are already in high demand domestically, and they openly and willingly pursue careers in areas of the economic sector that are well-populated by their co-ethnics and are relatively high paying.

As Joseph B., a second generation Filipino American, poignantly explains "there is this portrayal of Filipino Americans as a model minority, and that hurts the Filipino American community, because that portrayal gives younger (Filipino Americans) no motivation to try different things. It's only when (one is perceived as) a failure that (one) is told to change."

Unfortunately, the socialization of Filipino American youth towards the aforementioned fields is accompanied by general discouragement of higher education and employment in other fields, such as the arts, humanities, and social sciences. Still, most Filipino Americans across all generations believe that their socio-economic situation now in the United States is as good or better than most

Americans. For most of them, their economic situation has either remained stable or has steadily improved over the last few years.

The desire for Filipino immigrants to go to America and become American citizens was primarily a function of the unpleasant economic and political situation in the Philippines. The relatively free press, the Catholic Church's often critical responses towards the government, and the relatively high level of education (modeled after the American system), created numerous opportunities for Filipinos to engage in political discussion and debate well before their migration to the United States. The Philippines has long been a class based society, thus the idea that Filipino American political beliefs are based on economic interests still carries significant weight today, even in America. Moreover, current economic interests tend to shape Filipino American political behavior, and data indicate that those socio-economic conditions have remained stable or improved. Since this process occurs during adulthood, the process is more one of crystallization, rather than socialization.

5. Why Education Matters

Another important source of political information, according to the respondents, is education; responses were particularly strong among Filipino Americans who attended American colleges or universities. Table 5.7 shows that a large majority of the second generation respondents identified education as a major influence in defining their political ideology. The rates were lower among the 1.5 generation and significantly lower among the first generation. All of the 1.5 and

second generation respondents were educated primarily, if not exclusively, in American schools. Even among the first generation, the American influence in the Filipino education system promotes similar attitudes toward the acquisition of political knowledge, engagement in political debate, and involvement in political organizations (see Espiritu 1995, Bonus 2000). Those who stated the significance of education in shaping their political ideologies argued that interaction with their peers and instructors played a significant role in defining their political views.

Estring F., 78, and a first generation Filipino American, says he "didn't really learn about politics until high school, (and that his) interest in politics didn't become profound (until) college, because of my discussions with (classmates who were mostly Filipino American and African American)." What is interesting about Estring is that he attended college much later in life. He first served in the U.S. Navy. After he retired from the Navy, Estring attended Southwestern Community College (in San Diego), and finally graduated from San Diego State University in 1979 at the age of 51.

Prudimar S., 44, and a 1.5 generation Filipino American, believes that his teachers and college professors had the most impact on his political views. "Through education, I learned what it was to be a good citizen...(and through) discussions and debates with my mentors (in college), I realized the importance of knowing why you have the opinions you hold."

Debbie R. remembers, "(college) was where I learned about how much (American) society (had) showed little sensitivity about our (Filipino) cultural

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issues...and how inadequate the (American) government has been in providing social, economic, medical, and mental health services for all minorities."

Opinions are pretty much settled at adulthood, and discussions and debates that young adult Filipino Americans engage in college tend more to be a continuation and refinement of discussions and debates that began in their childhood years, be it with their friends, teachers, even family members. This is because many Filipino parents and their children have undergone similar experiences and attained similar levels of education. By contrast, these experiences and discussions are less likely to occur in Vietnamese American households in part because American or American-influenced education levels among the first generation and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese American respondents are lower.

Justin C., succinctly points out that "school is where you get to learn about the world, find the different points (of an issue), and choose your side." For Filipino Americans, this conclusion seems clear; for many first and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans the option of school did not exist, and thus subsequent choices (i.e. on political matters) proved elusive.

CHAPTER SIX: UNDERSTANDING THE GENERATIONAL EFFECTS AND THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESSES THROUGH INTERVIEW DATA OF VIETNAMESE AMERICANS

This chapter focuses on general trends that were discovered during the course of my interviews. As in the previous chapter, this section will focus on the following potential factors of socialization: 1) the transmission of cultural norms from parent to child, 2) the influence of Catholicism, 3) the function of ethnic enclaves, 4) how migration shapes one's economic views, and 5) the impact of education. While not all of these factors directly involve politics, they do offer some insight into the ability of parents to socialize their children. Understanding how effective parents are in socializing their children in non-political matters can reveal how effective they might be in transmitting political information and ideologies to their children. I will highlight disparities between first, 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans among relevant variables.

1. The transmission of cultural norms from parent to child

Communication barriers and cultural differences impeded the ability of the first generation to effectively transmit political ideologies to their offspring. Specifically, the process of resettlement in the United States meant that there were large economic implications associated with English fluency, which gave the second generation more economic opportunities and more power within the Vietnamese-

American household than it otherwise would in a Vietnamese household (in Vietnam). Moreover, life in the United States made it difficult for the first generation to hold onto and transmit traditional Vietnamese ideals to their offspring, who were often open to, if not, totally embracing, assimilation into American society. While the first and older 1.5 generation remained relatively detached from American politics, the younger 1.5 and second generation were more connected with these issues, because of the latter's' political socialization by institutions such as American popular culture, education and the media. The bottom line is that there are significant limitations in what is transmitted from the first generation to the 1.5 or second generation. Therefore, the offspring must often look elsewhere to get information and to develop their own beliefs.

The culture shock of Vietnamese immigrants in the United States adversely impacted the ability of first-generation Vietnamese parents to transmit most cultural values to their 1.5 or second generation children. According to the data from this project, the proportion of first generation respondents identified themselves as "strongly Vietnamese," or as "Bicultural Vietnamese and American" was about even. By contrast, most of the second generation identified themselves as "strongly American" (see table 6.1). These figures suggest that limited cultural transmission from parents to children is reflected by differing views of self-identification between generations.

Table 6.1 Adherence and Identification to Vietnamese and American Values

	Generation Group		
	Second	1.5	First
Strongly Vietnamese	2 (10.5%)	3 (25.0%)	17 (48.6%)
Bicultural Vietnamese and American	5 (26.3%)	6 (50.0%)	15 (42.9%)
Strongly American	12 (63.1%)	3 (25.0%)	3 (8.6%)

James L., 24, and a 1.5 generation Vietnamese American who immigrated in 1992 points out, "it's had to talk to my parents about my problems, because they don't really understand. Their (lives are) mostly about work and supporting the family (financially). Part of it is the language, but it's more about experiences. (For me), it was about friendships and relationships...what was in fashion and what was hip. When my parents were young, it was all about survival and learning how to live in different places (to avoid the war zones)."

Many younger Vietnamese Americans expressed difficulty relating to their parents' because of the stark differences in environments that they and their parents grew up in. Traditional Vietnamese norms and beliefs are perceived by the younger generation to be impractical and obsolete in the United States. Moreover, the "Americanization" of the young 1.5 and second generation is often met by resistance among the first and older 1.5 generation, because the older groups perceive the "Americanization" process as an act of detaching one's self from their Vietnamese roots.

Anh L. 31, and a 1.5 generation Vietnamese American adds that "it was hard to talk to my parents because they didn't understand my friends and their families and backgrounds. My parents were nice to (my friends), but there weren't any common interests, nothing that (they) could talk about. I guess growing up, I was more interested (in learning about my friends' backgrounds) than in learning mine." She concludes that her parents and other first generation Vietnamese Americans have less interest in learning about other cultures, and are more interested in preserving and maintaining Vietnamese culture. By contrast, second generation Vietnamese Americans are more open to learning about other cultures and are less interested in strictly holding on to Vietnamese culture.

Separation between first or 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans and their parents, even temporarily, also made it difficult for second generation Vietnamese Americans to learn and uphold traditional Vietnamese cultural practices. Part of the problem, the data suggests, is that many of the cultural practices--except for language, celebration of Tet, and religion--were not adequately transmitted even to the first or 1.5 generation from their parents and older relatives. After all, Vietnam had been ravaged by war for three decades prior to the Fall of Saigon. Constant relocations inside the country made it difficult to maintain localized identities with, and cultural practices unique to, specific regions in Vietnam. The lengthy and cumbersome process of resettlement (from Vietnam to refugee camps to permanent settlements in the United States) contributed to this difficulty (Rutledge 1992, Robinson 1998).

Nhan H., 30, and a second-generation concludes, "other than parties (around

Tet), and the food, there really isn't much that (the second generation) takes from (traditional Vietnamese culture). My parents encouraged me to be American and to take on (or embrace) American life, (even though) I saw (that it was) hard on them sometimes (to be in America)." The implication is that the transmission of culture from parent (first generation) to child (1.5 or second generation) is hampered by the fact that the parents' Vietnamese culture is stunted or marginalized in America--ethnic enclaves being noteworthy exceptions--and that the children are not really learning their American culture from their parents. This coincides with the children's widely held perception that American culture is more useful and relevant to their lives.

The remnants of war made it difficult for the first generation to transmit what limited knowledge and understanding of Vietnamese culture they did have to their offspring. Moreover, the impetus to transmit previously held traditional Vietnamese culture was weakened due to resettlement in the United States and the potential clash with American culture. This is often referred to as the "culture shock," experienced by first and older 1.5 Vietnamese Americans upon their arrival to the United States (Chan 1991, Takaki 1998).

The most prominent example of "culture shock" is the language barrier, which confronted most of the first and 1.5 generation. Their inability to speak English fluently greatly limited their social, educational and economic opportunities, and impacted the power dynamics of the family structure. Binh L., 29 and a second generation Vietnamese American, observes "because my parents' English wasn't too good, we had to explain to them what things meant; like if we got a letter from the

city, county, or some official, I'd be like the go-between with my parents and the company or office, (while) on the phone." Here, the children (usually 1.5 or second generation) do not contend with the language barriers facing the first and older 1.5 generation. Thus, the children hold greater responsibilities and have more input regarding family matters, especially if these matters require communication and interaction with English-speaking institutions (schools, bureaucracies, businesses, etc.)

Binh L. also notices subtle changes in his parents' behavior, due to language barriers. "(It is) weird with my parents sometimes. Like when we're with other Vietnamese, they love to talk and joke with (the others). But it seems like when they're with (people of) other races, they seem more tight and quiet, don't say a lot. It's not like they're mad or being mean, just shy, I think." He concludes that it is often more difficult for first and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans to develop personal relationships as easily with other Americans because he feels that some Vietnamese Americans are somewhat insecure about their accents and their command of the English language, which may lead some to falsely infer that Vietnamese Americans are not as intelligent.

Phuc L., a 1.5 Vietnamese American, adds that "in a way, my parents were (dependent) on me to explain to them--to help them--make decisions about the family because my English was so much better than theirs." Phuc's ability to speak English, education (she graduated from Brown University in 1997), and subsequent financial contribution to the family, essentially provided her a certain power and authority in

her family. As an accountant, Phuc is earning substantially more than her parents ever did. She concludes that many 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans who overcame the English language barrier were more insulated from the culture shocks experienced by the first generation and had more economic opportunities.

Because of her role as the English-speaking representative for her parents when dealing with official matters regarding the family, Phuc had greater autonomy than most of her female Vietnamese peers growing up in San Diego. "Even though I had (many) Vietnamese (girl) friends that were kept (home) by their parents, I was pretty free to go out (on my own)." Generally speaking, Vietnamese family structures tend to be patriarchical and male-dominated (Kibria 1990). However, children (especially daughters, such as in Phuc's case) can wield a certain degree of freedom from their parents, given the greater responsibilities bestowed upon them by their parents in response to the disparities in their knowledge of English. In other words, parents become more dependent on their children and therefore are more inclined to trust their children to make their own personal decisions. Greater parental dependence resulted in greater individual autonomy for the children. Power dynamics in the Vietnamese American family shifted away from the more traditional, patriarchical, Vietnamese family. This contributes to the greater detachment between the first and second generation Vietnamese Americans and to the culture shock of first and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese American males. Consequently, such conditions make it less likely that first and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese American can transmit their political beliefs to their offspring. In most instances, the (second generation)

offspring are more aware of and involved with the American political and bureaucratic environment than their parents. Moreover, most Vietnamese American women are as aware and engaged in politics as Vietnamese American men. Thus, the traditional Vietnamese patriarchical model, as far as American political beliefs are concerned, is often disregarded by the second generation.

Despite some limitations in the transmission of traditional Vietnamese culture from parent to child, two core values that were effectively imprinted on the children by the parents are education and hard work, according to the interview data. Historically, the vast majority of Vietnamese immigrants to the United States had relatively low levels of education and English fluency, save the first two waves of refugees who left between 1975 an 1978. The interview data suggest that while it was almost impossible for the first generation Vietnamese Americans to take advantage of educational opportunities, they understood the long term economic benefits of having an education, especially a college degree. For the first generation, pressing financial conditions made it difficult for them to go to school, work, and support their families all at the same time. Thus, the first generation impressed upon their offspring (the 1.5 and second generations) to take advantage of these educational opportunities, while they (the parents) provided the financial means--through hard work and savings--to ensure that their offspring were insulated from similar financial difficulties.

While many of the female Vietnamese respondents clamored about what they perceived as a severe double standard between Vietnamese males and females,

education was a value strongly ingrained among all Vietnamese children. Thina N., 29, and 1.5 generation Vietnamese American, explains that "my parents didn't have a chance to go to school for very long because they moved around so much in Vietnam (because of the war) But when they got here, my parents, especially my dad, said that I had to go to school, so that 'I could have a good life.' (My parents) always pushed me, but I knew they were proud of me." Thina also explains that her parents and other first generation Vietnamese Americans see education as an "equalizer," as a vehicle to level the playing field between Vietnamese Americans and other Americans. In other words, education would ultimately promote the future welfare of Vietnamese Americans. In fact, the data suggests that all generational groups favored strong government support of education.

Nguyen N., 40, and a 1.5 generation Vietnamese American, points out "my parents (tried very hard and) constantly reminded me that school and education were important...that (with an education) we can be an example for others." She adds, "ever since I was young, (my parents taught me) the value of education." Nguyen believes it is socially acceptable for Vietnamese women in America to work, unlike in Vietnam. Consequently, more 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese American women are able to parlay their education into lucrative jobs, which means a greater share in the financial contribution of the family and more relative power in the family.

Benson K., 20, and a second generation Vietnamese American, adds "my mom (herself a 1.5 generation Vietnamese American) is a nurse, but she used to tell

(me and my siblings) how wealthy in Vietnam would never work." In Vietnam, higher education was a status symbol for Vietnamese women; in America, education is an agent of financial and domestic (familial) power.

Lynn L. 27, and a 1.5 Vietnamese American, concedes that "(having an) education was the most important value I learned from my parents. My mom didn't have (much of an) education, and my dad only finished high school. They (Lynn's parents and their peers) couldn't go to school because of the war. When we (arrived in the United States), my dad explained that (I) needed to get an education so that I could communicate, and I needed (an education) to understand other people (of different cultures), especially in my workplace."

English is overwhelmingly the primary language of the younger 1.5 and second generations, though communication with their parents usually consists of a mix of English and Vietnamese. They suggest that being born and raised in the United States, combined with the values of hard work and education imprinted on them by their parents provided them with more educational opportunities. While it would appear that expanding economic opportunities would also arise among these groups, there is limited evidence from my research to substantiate that claim. Nevertheless, most of the first and older 1.5 generation could not take advantage of the educational opportunities, because meeting employment demands and immediate financial obligations made it almost impossible for them to go to school. However, their efforts made it possible for the younger 1.5 and second generation to utilize educational opportunities. Greater educational opportunities mean greater economic

opportunities, especially for women.

In political terms, the transmission of political values and beliefs from Vietnamese American parents to their children is even more limited than cultural values and beliefs. A major exception is the unified distaste of the communist regime in Vietnam, which has remained in power since 1975. Evelyn N., 30, and a first generation Vietnamese American, explains "when my relatives would get together, the men would mostly talk about business (and making money). If they did talk about (political issues), it was mostly about what was going on in Vietnam, about (Premier) Pham, and when would the communists ever give up power." Lien et al (2001) show that Vietnamese Americans who engage in American politics overwhelmingly support Republicans. While the interview data is limited in explaining why this is the case, I offer two hypotheses that might explain this phenomenon. First, Republicans have an established reputation of being more anti-communist, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, when major waves of Vietnamese immigrants first arrived in the United States. Second, a large number of first generation Vietnamese Americans became small-business owners, a group that tends to support Republican economic policies.

Still, there is a high level of political apathy among the Vietnamese American community. Lien et al (2001) shows that the level of Vietnamese American political participation significantly lags behind other Asian American groups, and still further behind all Americans. Most interviewees in this project, across all generations, reported little interest in political participation. However, the 1.5 and second

generation held broader and deeper opinions as well as a desire to be more informed

on American issues and government. Not surprisingly, political ideologies between

respondents and their parents differed primarily because of the high percentages of

parents who were "not political." According to the second generation respondents,

this political ideological split from their parents was overwhelming.

The data in 6.2 reveal the high level of disinterest by the respondents' parents;

a majority of all Vietnamese American respondents claim that their ideological views

differed from their parents, because their parents expressed no interest in politics.

This view is significantly higher among second generation respondents, which

supports the view that apathy in American politics remains high among Vietnamese

immigrants. The reliability of these results is open to some debate (see the Chapter 3

section on the Cautionary Note of Offspring Reports of Parental Attitudes).

However, assuming these results are plausible, it is important to investigate possible

explanations for this outcome.

Table 6.2 Political Ideological Consistency between Respondent and Parent

		Generation Group	
	Second	1.5	First
Respondent and Parent are Similar	3 (15.8%)	4 (33.3%)	23 (65.7%)
Respondent and Parent are Dissimilar (Ideologically)	2 (10.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Respondent and Partent are dissimilar (Parents not political)	14 (73.7%)	8 (66.7%)	12 (34.3%)

Phuc L., points out "I think the reason (why I) never got involved with politics (was) because of what happened in Vietnam with the communists. I think my parents are a little afraid to criticize the government, because they might get into trouble. I get that feeling because my mother gets uncomfortable when I criticize the President (George W. Bush) and the Republicans (in Congress), for all the bad stuff going on right now."

Vietnamese family relations were often strained due to the nearly three decades of war, followed by a two decade-long suspension of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the United States and increasingly stringent regulations regarding the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees to the United States during the 1980s. As refugees and other immigrants began to resettle in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, many had experienced at least some prolonged periods of physical separation from other family members. For others, their family members had

perished in the war or in failed attempts to escape and seek shelter in neighboring countries. Parent-child separation occurred for many of the earlier Vietnamese immigrants (those who arrived in the 1970s or 1980s).

For most first generation Vietnamese Americans, their exposure to war, limited formal education, and authoritarianism in Vietnam, made it difficult for them to learn about and debate political issues. Historically, the Indochina wars were viewed first as a crusade against colonialism, and later as a proxy war for Cold War supremacy. But for millions of Vietnamese, international politics were inconsequential in helping them cope with their daily lives. War made it almost impossible for most Vietnamese to engage in open ideological discussions in a safe and peaceful manner. Those who dared challenge the policies of Communist regime faced possible sentences to "re-education centers" and other forms of political persecution (Hawthorne 1982, Chan 1991). Moreover, access to education was limited for most Vietnamese, meaning that a primary vehicle for acquiring political knowledge was unavailable to them.

Another important consideration for the first generation was the vast differences in political institutions between Vietnam and the United States after 1975. Vietnam has had a socialist state, and a one-party electoral system. Consequently, there was no viable model of alternative ideologies and philosophies. In summary, the factors of pre-Adult Socialization were so powerful in ingraining political "apathy" upon the first generation that this apathy had crystallized once they settled in the United States.

While disinterest in most American political issues exists among the first generation, two clear exceptions are education and community (business) issues. This is because one or both of these issues significantly affect the interests of all Vietnamese Americans. Despite these exceptions, the American political ideologies of the first generation Vietnamese Americans are underdeveloped. Consequently, a knowledge vacuum exists for the 1.5 and second generations, early in their lives, when it comes to the American political system. Thus, while some cultural and social values are effectively transmitted from parent to child, political values and beliefs are not transmitted because there are few (if any) for the parents to transmit.

2. <u>Catholicism and Vietnamese Americans: Not Enough Information</u>

French colonization in Vietnam began in the 1860s in response to attempts by other Western powers to establish trading ports around China: Spain (and later, the United States) had the Philippines, Britain colonized Hong Kong and Malaysia, the Netherlands colonized Indonesia. Just as the Spanish missionaries did in the Philippines, French missionaries promoted the spread of Catholicism in Vietnam (Chan 1991). Even after the French were defeated in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Catholicism remained a prominent religion among the South Vietnamese elite. In fact, South Vietnamese President, Ngo Dinh Diem, was himself a practicing Catholic. At the time of the first waves of Vietnamese immigration to the United States, Catholic Charities and other local American Catholic parish communities played a prominent role in the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees (Loescher and Scanlon

1986).

Despite the historical, religious, and functional influence of Catholic

organizations, the data from this project suggest little effect of Catholicism on

political ideology among the Vietnamese American respondents. This is because

only 12% (eight out of 67 respondents) identified themselves as Catholic, and only

three of those eight respondents (all second generation) suggested that Catholicism

had any influence over their political opinions.

3. The role of residential and commercial ethnic enclaves on socialization

In a basic, somewhat superficial sense, ethnic enclaves are neighborhoods or

communities where a large proportion of residences or businesses are owned or

occupied by ethnic or racial groups. Historical examples include "Chinatown" in

New York or "Little Tokyo" in Los Angeles. Modern ethnic enclaves, however, also

include communities that have large populations of specific ethnic groups due to

immigration and resettlement patterns. Examples of these enclaves include the

California cities of Cerritos (with a large Southeast Asian American community),

Rosemead (Chinese American), and South San Francisco (Filipino American). These

communities enable people of similar cultural and ethnic backgrounds to interact with

and communicate with each other as they collectively deal with the process of

immigration or resettlement in the United States. Ethnic-specific economic, political,

and cultural organizations are usually rooted in these communities. Larger

concentrations of specific ethnic groups who live or visit these enclaves enable

ethnic-specific organizations and institutions to thrive and mobilize their membership. Thus, in a deeper sense, these ethnic enclaves might serve to strengthen Asian cultural values and shape political ideology.

The first generations are more dependent and influenced by ethnic enclaves than the second generation. For the first generation, enclaves enable them to avoid or minimize assimilation into mainstream American society, to assert their Vietnamese identity, to establish and maintain ties to Vietnam, to create social networks, to express ethnic community pride, and to take advantage of ethnic-based economic opportunities. Many political debates which engage mainstream Americans are overlooked or deemed insignificant in Vietnamese enclaves. There is a disconnect between political business in Vietnamese enclaves and that in greater American society. This disconnect discourages many first generation Vietnamese Americans from engaging in American politics; the former see no need to get involved. Enclaves are essentially autonomous and self-contained units. Vietnamese Americans linked to these neighborhoods are reluctant to engage in political debate on American issues or mobilize into political opposition of American institutions, because of their shared experiences of persecution while in Vietnam. As stated earlier, exceptions to this behavior include support of Republican candidates by small business owners and the steadfast anti-communist sentiment in Vietnamese politics.

According to the data in Table 6.3, all of the first generation and most of the 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans had lived in or frequently visited ethnic enclaves in California, namely those in Santa Clara, Westminster, and Garden Grove.

By contrast, few of the second generation Vietnamese Americans ever lived in an

ethnic enclave though most have regularly visited these locations.

Table 6.3 Frequency of living or regularly visiting in ethnic enclaves

		Generation Group	
Respondent	Second	1.5	First
Lived or Visited Ethnic Enclave	6 (31.6%)	4 (33.3%)	19 (54.3%)
Visited Ethnic Enclave	11 (57.9%)	6 (50.0%)	16 (45.7%)
Neither Lived nor Visited Ethnic Enclave	2 (10.5%)	2 (16.7%)	0 (0.0%)

*"visited" literally means that the respondent regularly visited a Vietnamese ethnic enclave

For the first and 1.5 generation, ethnic enclaves provided Vietnamese

Americans space for social gatherings, language and cultural schools, and practicing

their religion (most of the respondents identified as Buddhist). Nguyen N., explains,

"the (Vietnamese enclaves) are where you can get information on what is going on

Vietnam today. (The mainstream media rarely) has any news (about Vietnam)." The

(enclave and community) work hard to let us know what is going on there." Nguyen,

her family, and her Vietnamese American friends still maintain a strong connection

with Vietnam. In fact, since the normalization of American and Vietnamese relations

in 1997, many first generation Vietnamese Americans have made visits to Vietnam

with their (1.5 and second generation) children.

Hanh W., 47, and a first generation Vietnamese American, contributes, "(the enclaves are) areas where it's easy to 'suck in' culture and food. They are places where you can (be Vietnamese) and speak your language." Consequently, she and many of her Vietnamese American friends are more comfortable and feel freer to be themselves in such environments.

Ngan T., 19, and a second generation Vietnamese American, acknowledges the necessary role that ethnic enclaves have on Vietnamese immigrants, but discounts their impact on her and other American-born Vietnamese. "I lived in the eastern part of San Jose, where there is a large Vietnamese community, over by Lion Plaza. I went to many events there that celebrated Tet (the Vietnamese Lunar New Year). There were many commercial Vietnamese establishments, and the (residential) neighborhoods (were predominantly Vietnamese)." She explains that it was easier for the immigrants to function around here because of 'familiarity' due to their common language and higher cultural comfort levels. "(However,) the enclaves never had a specific influence of culture on me...even though the business leaders there (were influential in the enclave), they never influenced me politically or culturally."

The organizational structure inside Vietnamese enclaves is horizontal, but unified. Activities, events, and programs are organized by consortiums of prominent first or 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans who operate businesses in the enclaves though they usually live in affluent, suburban communities, away from the enclave. The respondents stated that businesses owners tend to be the leaders of the community, but there is no hierarchy of leadership within the community, in contrast

to the vertically-organized Gongsuo or CCBA in the Chinese-American community (see Nee and Nee 1973 and Chan 1991). Rather, close personal relationships are created and developed from what were initially patron-client relationships. There is a greater sense of cooperation, rather than competition, between first and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans.

Hieu-Ngoc M., 45, and a first generation Vietnamese American, explains "we would go out to Vinh Hung (a Vietnamese-owned supermarket in San Diego's Mira Mesa community) because the owner is a good friend of mine. Our families know each other since we arrived in San Diego (in 1989)." He suggests that there is a great sense of connectedness between and among the first and 1.5 generation because they live in or frequently visit local Vietnamese enclaves. There is a mutual sense of ownership in the community by all, visitors and vendors.

Pham L., 39, and a first generation Vietnamese American, recalls "we (would go) to Westminster (on some weekends) for shopping and to eat (in the family-owned restaurants). There aren't many Vietnamese restaurants in Rosemead (where I live). The suggestion here is that for the first generation, the enclaves are often the only locales where Vietnamese businesses can survive, that there are geographical limitations to where businesses can "set up shop." These limitations are market-based economic niches, not legally mandated neighborhoods like San Francisco Chinatown (Nee and Nee 1973). Enclaves affirm the sentiment that Vietnamese businesses can only succeed in Vietnamese neighborhoods.

Hieu-Ngoc M., offers a potential explanation for this. "We have loyalty

towards our friends (who operate or work in small businesses). Some have stores, restaurants (or) markets. Some are workers. We go to our friends' businesses because we want to help them, and they take care of us. We support each other...knowing people is important (to succeed). It's not just about (attracting and keeping) customers. It's about making friends, sharing a good time, helping each other." The Vietnamese patron-client relationships go much deeper than other patron-client relationships. Beyond the business relationship, there exists a mutual emotional investment in the relationship. The customer wants his friend's business to succeed; the owner wants the customer to feel especially welcome and appreciated for his patronage.

Cuong Van T., 28, and a first generation Vietnamese American, notes that "you can't have conversations with (the owner or employees of) Denny's or Coco's. In a (Vietnamese restaurant), you feel special, you're a special customer, and they take care of you, that you're better than regular customers."

Politically speaking, the enclaves enable Vietnamese Americans to engage in political discourse regarding the situation in Vietnam. The large concentration of Vietnamese Americans here makes it relatively easy to inform and politically mobilize the community. Although the community is capable of arousing political activity, Vietnamese Americans tend to be relatively disengaged in most arenas of American politics, with the exception of issues relating to small business, such as taxes, fees, or zoning issues. Lien et al (2001) illustrate the low levels of Vietnamese American naturalization and overall political participation. Because a significant

concentration of Vietnamese Americans are small business owners, this might partially explain why the few Vietnamese Americans who are citizens, and who do have an interest in American politics, tend to vote Republican. However, the interview data does not unequivocally support that argument. This is because of of the high level of political apathy that most Vietnamese Americans have, including the small business owners.

4. Migration's effect on views regarding Economic Policy and Opportunity

First and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans have been overwhelmingly critical of the political and economic system in Vietnam, which has only begun to flourish in the last decade. The fall of the Soviet Union (the primary supporter of the Vietnamese economy from the 1960s to 1980s), the slow recovery after more than three decades of war, and the haphazard transition from an agrarian to industrial economy, has made it extremely difficult for Vietnam to develop their economy as successfully as their neighboring countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore.

First and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans who came to the United States during the early waves of migration argued that the Communist regime was more interested in seizing (South Vietnamese) land and factories than actually helping the entire Vietnamese population. Migrants believed that the Hanoi government used the South's resources to fortify the victorious (but beleaguered) military and reward non-Viet Minh communist members (the Viet Minh were pro-Communists who fought in the South). This was because there was an inherent distrust between the North and

South, even among Communists. Moreover, skilled laborers (much more numerous in the South) were underutilized as many were forced to work at rural labor camps and re-education centers (Freeman 1995). Economic conditions in Vietnam did not improve significantly for many years after the end of the war in 1975. Basic items like food and clothing were often scarce and many prominent South Vietnamese were dispossessed of their land and businesses--notably, the ethnic Chinese-Vietnamese community, many of whom were merchants in the South and comprised the second wave of Vietnamese emigrants (Heibert 1979). Although the economic stagnation in southern Vietnam might have been enough to drive out millions of refugees, the respondents argued the fear of political persecution by the new Communist government was the primary reason for leaving (Chan 1991, Freeman 1995).

Vietnamese immigrants who arrived in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s received federal assistance in the form of cash payments, health care, housing arrangements, and food stamps. Depending on the specific time of arrival, immigrants were provided this assistance anywhere between one and two years (Chan 1991). While all the respondents appreciated the federal assistance, job opportunities remained very limited. Most of the respondents did not have college educations when they left Vietnam, nor did many initially possess sufficient fluency in English to acquire higher-paying jobs. Thus, the transition out of welfare was difficult.

Still, the data in Table 6.4 show that the large majority of respondents believe that the American government has positively affected the economic welfare of Vietnamese American community.

Table 6.4 Responses to the Performance of the U.S. Government to Promote the
Welfare of Vietnamese Americans

		Generation Group	
	Second	1.5	First
Positive	14 (73.7%)	10 (83.3%)	23 (65.7 %)
Negative	5 (26.3%)	2 (16.7%)	4 (11.4%)
Unclear/Don't Know	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (22.9%)

The Vietnamese American community has grown significantly due to high
immigration levels and the burgeoning second generation population. Some
respondents were able to move to more lucrative, blue collar types of employment in
the construction, service, casino gaming, and manufacturing industries. Others have
parlayed their savings to start small Asian-niche businesses like restaurants, stores,
and markets. According to the data in table 6.5, all of the first and 1.5 generation
who responded to the question, believed that their socio-economic situation was
better in the United States than it was in Vietnam. The bottom line here is that
despite the economic limitations for the first and older 1.5 generation, the overall
economic situation for Vietnamese Americans is significantly better now than it was
when they first arrived three decades ago. Job opportunities in the service sector for
these individuals are more plentiful due to co-ethnic employment networks (see
below), and some of these jobs are quite lucrative. Consequently, more Vietnamese
Americans are able to live middle-class lifestyles, much to the benefit off their
offspring. Still, political involvement for these Vietnamese Americans remains
limited.

Table 6.5 Comparing the Socio-Economic Situation of Vietnam and the United States

	Generation Group	
	1.5	First
United States is Better	7 (58.3%)	24 (68.6%)
The Vietnam is Better	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
About the Same	0 (0.0%)	9 (25.7 %)
Don't Know/No Opinion	5 (41.7%)	2 (5.7%)

The interviews also suggest that Vietnamese American labor has benefited from the casino gaming industry, which has greatly expanded in California in the last 10 to 15 years, especially in Indian reservations. The industry has enabled a considerable number of immigrants lacking high school or college educations to earn between $40,000 and $100,000 a year with benefits (according to respondents' reports and estimations), working as dealers, slot-machine technicians, pit-bosses, or table-game supervisors. The interview data suggest that these workers were regular casino patrons before securing employment there.

Minh N., 49, and a first generation Vietnamese American, recalls "(my friends and I) would go out and gamble at night for fun after work (he worked at an electronics assembly plant). (At the casino), we would talk to the other Vietnamese (dealers and supervisors), and they said they need dealers and service (e.g. waiters and waitresses), and the money was better (than at the plant where we worked)."

The burgeoning casino gaming industry has established for the Vietnamese

American community in California an employment network, whereby Vietnamese laborers penetrate into an industry, reach a position of some power in the industry, then encourage other potential Vietnamese laborers (i.e. their friends and family) to follow suit. This is not to suggest that the casino gaming industry is exclusive to Vietnamese Americans. However, the data suggests that these employment networks are vital to the economic well-being of first and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans, because educational and language barriers are not a hindrance for them in this industry. The growth of the California gaming industry has provided major economic opportunities for Vietnamese and other Asian immigrants. The economic and labor environment of immigrant Vietnamese Americans can significantly influence not only their views on social and economic issues, but also influence their engagement and participation in American politics, because they have a vested interest in the American economy.

Tuan L., 29, and a first generation Vietnamese American remembers "(when) I was done with high school, I really didn't want to go to college right away. My uncle was a pai-gow dealer (pai-gow is a form of Asian poker, very popular in California casinos today) at Viejas (an Indian reservation in eastern San Diego county), and he told me to that they were looking for dealers, and the pay was good (especially) for young (people). I went to dealer school (in San Diego) for two months. (My uncle) said he'd hook me up. So I applied and got an audition...(I've) been working here (at Sycuan Casino, also located in eastern San Diego) more than a year now. So despite his limited education, dealers like Tuan are able to earn enough

to maintain a middle-class lifestyle, which means that they are more likely to have the resources to eventually support their (second generation) children. Still, for the first generation, the language barriers and the relatively low levels of education (compared to the younger 1.5 and second generations) suggest that opportunities remain limited to blue-collar types of employment.

While some Vietnamese Americans work in blue-collar jobs, others have established successful ethnic Asian-based small businesses such as restaurants, salons, and markets. As discussed earlier, these businesses tend to be located inside ethnic enclaves; to a smaller extent, they might exist in racially diverse areas with significant Asian American populations. Their businesses cater to an Asian "niche" market, and do not directly compete with major corporations and chains. These "mom and pop" operations are geared toward providing a sufficient income to support the family, rather than maximizing market share and growth potential.

Huy D., 21, and a second generation Vietnamese American, says that "my mother and aunties (mom's sisters) own a salon (in Rosemead, California), and the place is great to make friends, learn the latest gossip (about friends and relatives). The co-workers (employees) really go at it. So even if the days are long, the conversations make the time go by. Plus, it helped support our family (financially)." Huy's mother is not concerned about challenging Supercuts (or any other national hair care chains) for customers, nor is she interested in expanding her business empire beyond the one salon she owns. Instead, her concern is more modest. Yes, she wants to make a profit (all businesses do), but just as important is the self-perception

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"payoff," associated with the feeling of owning a business in the community, and the daily opportunity to socialize with her regular clientele, many of whom are her friends. In other words, Huy's mother's business is a marker of social status in the local community and a platform for developing her social network.

The first and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans worked hard, sacrificed, and saved in order to improve their socio-economic situation, which opened up educational opportunities for their offspring. Thus, despite educational and language disadvantages, many first and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans have managed to create middle-class lifestyles for their offspring. This laid the foundation for the younger 1.5 and second generation to penetrate into higher status, higher paying fields like technology and the health profession. The ability to adapt to a new environment and effectively thrive despite adverse circumstances and limited opportunities was the challenge for the first and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans. For the second generation, earlier generations' personal stories of survival and hardship explain why particular values such as education, hard work, and family are aggressively emphasized and successfully transmitted to the second generation. By contrast, other traditional Vietnamese values such patriarchy, religion (specifically Buddhism), deference to authority and elders, and conformism are not as effectively transmitted to the second generation.

Political values are hardly transmitted from the parents to their children. The political landscape that the first and older 1.5 generation faced growing up in Vietnam was fundamentally different from what the younger 1.5 and second generation faced

in the United States. A political knowledge vacuum exists for the younger 1.5 and

second generations early in their lives. While some cultural and social values are

effectively transmitted from parent to child, political values and beliefs are not

transmitted, because there are few (if any) for the parents to transmit. Despite the

limited role of Vietnamese parents as agents of political socialization in America,

other factors such as interaction with Vietnamese or American political and

bureaucratic institutions, Vietnamese enclaves in American, and involvement in the

American economy can all fill that void and encourage them to take a greater interest

in American politics.

5. Why Education Matters

One of the biggest impacts that an American education has had on younger

1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans is that it broke down existing or

potential language barriers, which enabled them to be more receptive to political

information and debate affecting the United States. Moreover, the American

education system gives Vietnamese American students opportunities to participate in

student government and other institutions that are akin to American political

institutions (i.e. media, activism, community service). Furthermore, education

provides a forum and impetus for discourse and debate on current or relevant political

issues. The data from table 6.6 shows that the impact of education on shaping

political views varies between generations. Altogether, a large majority of the 1.5

and second generation respondents cited education as a factor that shaped their

political ideology, compared to only 20% of the first generation.

Table 6.6 Respondents state influences on political ideology

		Generation Group	
	Second	1.5	First
Education	13 (68.4%)	11 (91.7%)	7 (20.0%)
Media	14 (73.7%)	9 (75.0%)	17 (48.6%)
Television	14 (73.7%)	9 (75.0%)	17 (48.6%)
Radio	14 (73.7 %)	9 (75.0%)	12 (34.3%)
Internet	5 (26.3%)	4 (33.3%)	0 (0.0%)
Print	6 (31.6%)	7 (58.3%)	7 (20.0%)

As discussed earlier, the language barrier that confronts the first generation
Vietnamese Americans significantly affected their ability to integrate socially and
economically into American society. By contrast, elementary and secondary schools
give the 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans opportunities to develop
their English skills, interact with peers of different racial or ethnic backgrounds, and
learn about the history and function of American political institutions and social
organizations. Moreover, command of the English language makes it easier for the
1.5 and second generation to absorb more political information from the pre-
dominantly English speaking media (see table 6.6), and to scrutinize contrasting
opinions more effectively.

Within the framework of the education system, there are institutions that
provide students with opportunities for participation and even leadership. These
institutions enable and encourage Vietnamese American students to learn from their

leadership or participatory roles.

Phuc L., was an officer of the California Scholarship Federation (CSF) during her last two years at Chula Vista High School in southern San Diego county. CSF is the campus honors students society. Phuc served as secretary during her junior year, and was president her senior year. "The (CSF leadership experience) taught me a lot about how to communicate with others, about (exchanging ideas) with other people. I felt honored (to serve as) CSF president, because when I first came (to Chula Vista High School), I never thought I could be (a leader)." Phuc's experience with CSF taught her about how to make decisions, deal with people, and discuss issues--all important tools in defining one's own political beliefs.

While leadership or participatory roles in the campus community do not necessarily translate into leadership roles in society, such experiences do encourage Vietnamese Americans to engage in or become aware of matters affecting society. In other words, while most Vietnamese American students might not themselves become local, state, or federal officials, they at least recognize who these officials are and what functions these officials perform.

Many of the 1.5 and second generation respondents acknowledged that their first discussions or involvement in social and political issues occurred in college. Part of the "inspiration" stems from what they learned in history, social science, and ethnic studies courses. Discussions that began inside the classroom continued on the outside, and these conversations provoked some to become more informed.

Ngan T., 21, and a second generation Vietnamese American, explains "I really

didn't get involved with student government until I got to college (U.C. Santa Barbara)." During her college years, Ngan associated with politically active people, mostly Asian American students (Filipino Americans in particular) that she met through Asian cultural events and Asian American studies courses.

Diana V., 22, also a second generation Vietnamese American who attended U.C. Santa Barbara, adds "that classes (were) the dominant player, but occasional debates with friends (also contributed in forming her political beliefs)." For many Asian American students, Asian American studies courses represent the first time they learned how their ethnicity is intertwined with their lives, the first time they were exposed to Asian American history, the first time they read or learned anything about the cultural, social, and political theories that explained what they had observed growing up Asian American. For many, what they learned inspired them to learn more.

While political information that is taught in elementary and secondary school tends to be uniform and homogenous (see Greenstein 1965, and Hess and Torney 1967), the interview data from this project suggests opinions, ideas, and theories taught in college tend to be more diverse and conflicting, fueling the respondents' desires for more discussion, debate, and information. In many Vietnamese American households, the 1.5 and second generation respondents' claim that political information transfer and political debates were virtually non-existent, even frowned upon--Phuc L's criticism of President Bush and the republicans, to her mother's dismay, is a good illustration of this point. Nevertheless, the college years provided

most of these 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans their first opportunities to engage in these processes.

For many of the 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans, access to education enabled them to acquire knowledge of American political institutions and then subsequently use that knowledge to define and develop their own political ideologies. Because parents (the first generation) are not significant factors of political socialization, the socialization process occurs later in life for the 1.5 and second generations. Hence, theories of Adult socialization are more appropriate for explaining the development of American political ideologies among the 1.5 and second generation. Moreover, schools enable these groups to overcome the language barriers which the first generation faced. Consequently, the 1.5 and second generation can more effectively acquire and evaluate political information from the mainstream media than the first generation. Moreover, the vastness and variety of opinions expressed in the media expose an English-speaking Vietnamese American audience to relevant ideological debates that they themselves can engage in. Finally, the environmental restrictions to the acquisition of political knowledge and to involvement in political debate—war, limited access to education, and an authoritarian state with a one party electoral system—are non-existent for Vietnamese living in the United States.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this project was to examine the effects of nativity on political behavior. This project focused on two Asian-American groups: Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans. This project is grounded in the political science literature, and seeks to identify factors that shape or help crystallize political ideologies, specifically those related to, or affected by, one's nativity. This project not only draws comparisons between ethnic groups, but also between generational groups, based on nativity. The first generation consists of Asian-born immigrants who arrived in the United States as adults; the 1.5 generation consists of Asian-born immigrants who arrived in the United States as children; the second generation consists of American born citizens.

This project seeks to add to the political socialization debate: whether pre-adult socialization or adult socialization is a better model for the process that each of the ethnic and generational groups develops their political ideologies. The data suggest that the pre-adult socialization model is a better fit. Generally speaking, the respondents did not mentions events, which occurred during their adulthood that caused a significant transformation in their political beliefs--what Jaros (1973) called "generational change." Whether specific changes to the respondent during adulthood might prompt a transformation in political ideology--what Jaros (1973) called "maturational change," is possible among respondents who were or are in the military, but there is not enough interview data--not enough respondents--to clearly make this conclusion.

That said, the interview data suggest that political socialization tends to occur in early childhood for first generation and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans. Events in Vietnam such as war, political persecution, and language barriers impede the ability of these respondents to fully participate in the American political system and to engage in American political issues. Language barriers make certain sources of political information less accessible. Institutions like ethnic enclaves reduce the need of this group to assimilate into American political culture; these enclaves behave like semi-autonomous units that are detached from mainstream American political debate or discourse. This condition is also facilitated because the American born children of these respondents often become proxies or surrogates for their parents in order to minimize the effects of a language barrier and of detachment from political institutions. Furthermore, the legacy of war and political persecution in Vietnam discourages individuals from participating in American politics, especially in opposing or criticizing government policies. The political information that is derived from the experiences of these respondents growing up in Vietnam is often irrelevant or suppressed once they arrive in the United States. Thus, transmission of political ideologies to their younger 1.5 or second offspring is blunted.

Not surprisingly, the interview data suggest that political socialization for younger 1.5 and second generation and second generation Vietnamese American occur during late childhood. As suggested above, the lack of transmission of political knowledge and ideology from parent to child creates a vacuum in the minds of these respondents during early childhood. Parents have little relevant political knowledge

that they can transmit to their offspring; the changes in social, cultural and political environments make this so. Moreover, assuming that parents would even bother trying to transmit political ideologies to their children, given the parents' upbringing under communist oppression and political persecution, is problematic. Thus the younger 1.5 and second generation must catch up in later childhood by relying on other sources like schools, peers, and the media in order to gather political information. In other words, rather than learning political values from their parents in early childhood, the younger 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans learn them from other sources at a time when they are able to make more decisions on their own--during later childhood.

For first generation and older 1.5 generation Filipino Americans, the interview data suggest that political socialization may occur in either early or late childhood, depending on the upbringing of the respondent. The data suggests that the older respondents in these groups--those in their 60s and older--did not have parents who were fully engaged in the Philippine political system, because economic survival overshadowed any interest in political issues that the respondents' parents might have had. Thus, a political information vacuum exists for these respondents, who learned their political information and developed their political ideologies from schools and their peers in later childhood. This is similar to what younger 1.5 generation and second generation Vietnamese American respondents experienced.

For the younger respondents in these groups, the Marcos regime mobilized many of them to participate in the Philippine political system, or at the very least, to

become more politically aware. More of these respondents were involved in organizations that engaged in political opposition or criticism, such as universities, labor groups, the media, and the Catholic Church. Thus, from an early age, these respondents were exposed to political engagement and discussion, and the transmission of political ideology from parents to children was more effective. After the end of Marcos regime in 1986, the Philippines held open and contested elections, which facilitated an environment for further political debate and more policy discussions. Even after these respondents immigrated to the United States, they did not change their ideologies; rather their ideologies crystallized, given the similarities of important American and Philippine institutions. All of the respondents who immigrated to the United States were already fluent in English, and most of these individuals had relatively high levels of education. Since the Philippine education system is modeled after the American system--most notably, English instruction, study of American history, and high literacy rates--Filipino Americans were not subjected to the same types of language and educational barriers that their Vietnamese American counterparts had been. Fluency in English and college educations were not only markers of status for Filipino immigrants, but were often necessary in order to able to immigrate to the United States. Most had already well-defined political ideologies from the Philippines that could be carried over in the United States, and could be effectively transmitted to their American born offspring.

Moreover, the interview data suggest that political socialization also seems to occur in early childhood for younger 1.5 and second generation Filipino Americans.

There are some influential factors to consider here. First, the transmission of political

knowledge and values from parent to child is relatively strong, due to the well-

defined political ideologies of the Filipino American parents. Second, the relatively

high level of English fluency from an early age allows the younger 1.5 and second

generation Filipino Americans to access political information from other sources such

as schools, media, peers, or social and community organizations. Third, cohesive

family structures--where parents are educated and employed and where families are

financially stable and communicate significantly or primarily in English--make the

transmission of political values easier, because political discussions and debates

inside the family can occur regularly.

Key Agents of Socialization

English as Language Barrier: Lamare (1974) explained that the "language

environment has a major impact upon political socialization of Mexican American

children regarding orientations about the Anglo-American world. Chicano students

sharing the English language environment of Anglos manifest political values similar

to those of the Anglos" (p. 80). Lamare's conclusions are applicable in comparing

first and 1.5 generation Filipino Americans and Vietnamese Americans. The language

barrier helped restrict the political participation of Vietnamese Americans. Filipino

Americans of all nativity generations, on the other hand, were not subjected to the

same barriers, and could therefore access political information in much the same

manner and ease that other English-fluent Americans could.

Parental Influence: Tedin (1974) suggests that parents can exert considerable influence over their children on terms of political issues provided that the issues are important to the parent and if the child accurately interprets the views of the parents. The results of this project suggest that such a scenario is more likely in Filipino American households than in Vietnamese American households. There are two main reasons for this: First, the language barrier makes it more difficult for the first and 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans to acquire political information on the American system, therefore impeding their ability to formulate ideologies that could then be transmitted to their children. Second, assuming that the parents are willing (see Lamare 1974 p. 82), they can "play a major role in determining (the) initial political direction of (their) offspring (Niemi and Jennings 1991).

Ethnic Enclaves: Gimpel (2003) argues that "local communities contain all of the primary agents of message transmission to youth. Because the ethnic and racial composition of a community produces specific interest that influence the way in which information is translated into opinion, political viewpoints will vary as the ethnic and racial character of neighborhoods varies" (p.62). The results of this project show how younger 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans are relatively detached from ethnic enclaves, while first and older 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans are quite connected. As a result, there is a distinction between the communities that members of these groups identify with. The

community that the younger 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans identifies with is more heterogeneous, while the community that the older 1.5 and second generation Vietnamese Americans identifies with is more homogeneous.

Assessing One's Own Situation Post-Migration: Leaving for America, voluntarily or otherwise, was a significant event for the first and older 1.5 generation. The process of resettling is not always easy for the new American immigrants; change is never easy. The question is, once resettled, how do the immigrants assess their own situation now? The results in the project suggest that most respondents believe life in America is better than it would ever be in either the Philippines or Vietnam (see Tables 5.6 and 6.5). Inglehart (1977) explains that "changes that persist for some time gradually raise or lower an individual's aspiration levels in a given domain" (p.121). This might be the theory behind the facilitation of co-ethnic employment networks (see section 4 in Chapters 5 and 6), involving the health and casino gaming industries and the military among the first and 1.5 generation. These industries have financed middle-class lifestyles for many of the respondents, a welcome change from the often impoverished and fearful situation confronting these people years earlier in the Philippines or Vietnam. Moreover, decent paying jobs give these individuals more opportunities to enjoy their families, also contributing to their Overall Life Satisfaction level (see p. 117-118). However, Inglehart also states that "changes that persist for the very long term can lead to inter-generational value changes, with the result that different domains come to be given" greater priority (p. 121). This might

explain why co-ethnic employment networks are met with some resistance among second generation Filipino Americans (see chapter 5). Inglehart also points out that income is not the only important metric in assessing Overall Life Satisfaction (p. 117-118). The results from the project show that the socio-economic situation of Filipino and Vietnamese households has improved in a majority of respondents' households. Yet attitudes towards the American government and its performance in promoting the welfare of Asian Americans are more negative among the second generation; this despite living in conditions that are almost universally better than their parents.

Education Matters: Gimpel (2003) concludes that students who were interested in government related coursework tended to have higher levels of political participation later in life. Schools provide individuals the opportunity to learn about government, and to stimulate interest in the subject through discussions with others. The project revealed many instances of respondents mentioning the role that schools played in developing their interests in politics, which in turn motivates them to participate politically. To what extent schools are effectively politically socializing individuals is open to debate (Merelmen 1980, Jennings 1980). The younger 1.5 and second generation respondents of this project said that school, especially college, was where their political ideologies had been formulated.

Final Word: The Heterogeneity of Asian America

Asian America is not homogenous. It is an amalgamation of different

cultures, histories, and immigration experiences. It is rich and poor; it is educated

and uneducated; it speaks English fluently and barely at all; it is politically engaged

and ambivalent; it is the professional, the laborer, and the small business owner. For

too long, Asian Americans have been lumped together, perhaps because it was

impractical or inconvenient to do otherwise. However, it is time for scholars to cast

aside old perceptions of Asian America and embrace the richness and diversity that

this community truly represents.

APPENDIX 1: FILIPINO AMERICANS—INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Relating to Familial Background and Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Values and Political Ideology

1. Growing up in the (United States/Philippines), did you endure long periods of physical separation between you and your parents?
2. Did either of your parents die when you were a child?

2a. (If yes on 2) How has the separation between you and your (mother/father) affected your trust on people?

2b. (If yes on 2) How has the separation between you and your (mother/father) affected your trust in political leaders?

2c. (If yes on 2) How has the separation between you and your (mother/father) affected your view of the government?

3. Describe the extent in which your parents tried to teach you cultural values as you were growing up.
4. How aggressive would you say your parents were in trying to teach these cultural values to you?
5. Did your parents try to instill these values throughout your childhood?

5a. (If not to 5) At what point during your childhood did your parents try to instill these values in you?

6. Now that you are an adult, to what extent are your cultural values consistent or inconsistent with those of your parents?
7. Do you, culturally speaking, identify more as a Filipino, American, or both?
8. Now that you are an adult, to what extent are your political views consistent or inconsistent with those of your parents?

Relating to Catholicism

1. What religion do you most identify with? (If Catholic, skip set of remaining questions)
2. How Strong is your identification with Catholicism?
3. How often do you attend Mass?
4. In addition to attending Mass, describe any other involvement you have with the church or religion.
5. What teachings or values of the Catholic Church do you most identify with and try to live by?
6. How old were you when you began to identify as being Catholic?
7. To what extent has your involvement in the Catholic religion had an impact on your political views?

Relating to Ethnic Enclaves

1. Have you ever lived in a neighborhood or community where a large portion of the residents and/or businesses there were composed of people of the same ethnic group as you? If so, where?
2. Have you ever frequently visited neighborhoods or communities where a large

portion of the residents and/or businesses there were composed of people of the same ethnic group as you? If so, where? (if the answer to 1 or 2 is no, skip set of remaining questions)

3. How was (living or visiting) these areas helpful in shaping, maintaining, or learning Filipino cultural values?
4. Who in this community played an important role in shaping, maintaining, or teaching Filipino cultural values to you? (if someone is mentioned) How did they accomplish this?
5. How were your political views defined by your exposure to this community?

Relating to Migration (for First or Older 1.5 Generation), Self-Assessment of Socio-Economic Situation, and Perceptions of U.S. Economic Policies

1. (Immigrants only) How would you compare your socio-economic situation now and when you were living in the Philippines?
2. How would you compare your socio-economic situation with other Americans?
3. Has your socio-economic situation in the United States changed dramatically in the last few years? If so, how?
4. (Immigrants only) What are your views of the economic policies that were undertaken in the Philippines in the 1960s through the 1980s?
5. (Immigrants only) To what extent did these policies compare with those in the Philippines?
6. (Immigrants only) How do American economic policies compare with those in the Philippines?
7. How would you assess the way the U.S. government has promoted the economic welfare of Filipino Americans?

Relating to Identifying, Additional Respondent-Reported Factors, not Previously Addressed in the Interview

1. Aside from family, who were the people or institutions that have had the largest impact in influencing your political views? Elaborate on how they accomplished this.

APPENDIX 2: VIETNAMESE AMERICANS—INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Relating to Familial Background and Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Values and Political Ideology

1. Growing up in (the United States/Vietnam), did you endure long periods of physical separation between you and your parents?
2. Did either of your parents die when you were a child?

2a. (If yes on 2) How has the separation between you and your (mother/father) affected your trust on people?

2b. (If yes on 2) How has the separation between you and your (mother/father) affected your trust in political leaders?

2c. (If yes on 2) How has the separation between you and your (mother/father) affected your view of the government?

3. Describe the extent in which your parents tried to teach you cultural values as you were growing up.
4. How aggressive would you say your parents were in trying to teach these cultural values to you?
5. Did your parents try to instill these values throughout your childhood?

5a. (If not to 5) At what point during your childhood did your parents try to instill these values in you?

6. Now that you are an adult, to what extent are your cultural values consistent or inconsistent with those of your parents?
7. Do you, culturally speaking, identify more as Vietnamese, American, or both?
8. Now that you are an adult, to what extent are your political views consistent or inconsistent with those of your parents?

Relating to Ethnic Enclaves

1. Have you ever lived in a neighborhood or community where a large portion of the residents and/or businesses there were composed of people of the same ethnic group as you? If so, where?
2. Have you ever frequently visited neighborhoods or communities where a large portion of the residents and/or businesses there were composed of people of the same ethnic group as you? If so, where? (if the answer to 1 or 2 is no, skip set of remaining questions)
3. How was (living or visiting) these areas helpful in shaping, maintaining, or learning Vietnamese cultural values?
4. Who in this community played an important role in shaping, maintaining, or teaching Vietnamese cultural values to you? (if someone is mentioned) How did they accomplish this?
5. How were your political views defined by your exposure to this community?

Relating to Migration

1. (Immigrants only) How would you compare your socio-economic situation now and when you were living in the Vietnam?

2. How would you compare your socio-economic situation with other Americans?
3. Has your socio-economic situation in the United States changed dramatically in the last few years? If so, how?
4. (Immigrants only) What are your views of the economic policies that are or have been undertaken in Vietnam?
5. (Immigrants only) To what extent did these policies and the result of these policies, influence your decision to immigrate to the United States?
6. (Immigrants only) How do American economic policies compare with those in the Vietnam?
7. How would you assess the way the U.S. government has promoted the economic welfare of Vietnamese Americans?

Relating to Identifying, Additional Respondent-Reported Factors, not previously addressed in the Interview
1. Aside from family, who were the people or institutions that have had the largest impact in influencing your political views? Elaborate on how they accomplished this.

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